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I. INTRODUCTION
A. GENERAL
NAVSUP [Naval Supply Systems Command] , in conjunction with
the Fleet and Type Commanders, has initiated a large
number of actions to improve the process by which we
purchase our supplies and services on the open market.
These initiatives will not only correct systemic
purchasing deficiencies but will also provide direct
benefits to forces afloat by significantly reducing afloat
purchasing workload, improving afloat training, and
providing improved shore responsiveness and assistance.
The net result of our fleet purchase improvement program
will be to ensure the fleet is receiving responsive
purchasing support without sacrificing accountability and
integrity. The cornerstone of our efforts in this program
is the establishment of pierside purchasing
offices ... to relieve ships of the burden of processing
open purchase requirements by providing ships dedicated
and responsive purchasing support.
E.K. Walker, Jr. [Ref. 1]
Pierside Procurement came to the fleet in February 198 5
with the establishment of the first Pierside Procurement
office at the Naval Supply Center (NSC) Norfolk. (Pierside
Procurement and Pierside Purchasing are used interchangeably
throughout this thesis.) The concept of Pierside
Procurement is to centralize shipboard small purchasing at
ashore Naval Supply Centers or Naval Regional Contracting
Centers (NRCCs) to alleviate perceived weaknesses in afloat
small purchasing operations. The Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR) defines a small purchase as: " . . . an
acquisition of supplies, nonpersonal services and
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construction in the amount of $25,000 or less." [Ref.
2:13.1c! 1 ] The decision to implement Pierside Procurement
transferred the bulk of purchasing from the ships to
NSC/NRCC Pierside Procurement offices as a remedy for these
perceived weaknesses.
Incidents such as those aboard the USS Kitty Hawk, at
Naval Air Station Miramar, and Lockheed's $640 toilet seat,
have provided the impetus for Pierside Procurement. It was
discovered that the USS Kitty Hawk's supply system was in
such disarray that millions of dollars in equipment and
supplies were unaccounted for. Evidence of price-fixing,
fraud, kick-backs, cover-ups, and black market sales were
alleged aboard Kitty Hawk. These allegations lead to the
arrests of seven people purported to be involved in a scheme
to smuggle spare parts for the Navy's F-14 Tomcat to Iran.
[Ref. 3:p. 19]
The Naval Air Station (NAS) Miramar controversy
concerning overpricing of ashtrays and other spares, led to
the dismissal of three officers for irregularities in "the
purchase of spare parts during the period 1981 to the
present [July 1985]. . . ." [Ref. 4:p. 88] The officers
relieved included: Rear Admiral Thomas J. Cassidy, Jr.
,
Commander of the Fighter Airborne Early Warning Wing/Pacific
and Commander of the Naval Air Station from 1977 to 1979;
Reference refers to paragraph citations in the Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) . Henceforth, all references to
FAR will denote paragraph citations vice page numbers.
Captain Gary E. Hakanson, Commander Naval Air Station
Miramar, California and Commander Jerry L. Fronaburger, the
NAS Miramar Supply Officer.
The $640 toilet seat cover was "discovered" by Maine
Senator William Cohen. Senator Cohen was informed of the
toilet seat by a contractor in Washington state who had been
asked to bid on it in January of 1985. The toilet seat,
which is really a corrosion-resistant plastic case that fits
over a toilet, is used aboard the Navy's P-3C Orion.
In addition to the aforementioned problems, some of the
Navy's other procurement horror stories included:
- paying $435 for a claw hammer
- buying a $900 wrench
- procuring a coffee maker for $3,046.
Thus, centralized purchasing in the form of Pierside
Procurement was one of the Navy's responses to the recent
procurement horror stories.
A message issued by the Commander of the Naval Supply
Systems Command (COMNAVSUPSYSCOM) stated:
To assist forces afloat with their purchase function and
relieve them of most of this burden, a decision has been
made to transfer the bulk of afloat purchasing ashore.
[Ref. 5]
A supplemental message from the Commander-in-Chief of
the U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) stated:
As a result of USS Kitty Hawk investigation, COMNAVSUPSYS-
COM is providing dedicated pierside contracting support
for afloat commands starting 1 November 1985. [Ref. 6]
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Centralized purchasing was envisioned to offer the
following advantages to shipboard procurement:
- Relieve shipboard supply personnel of the purchasing
burden, thus saving valuable manhours (e.g., calls to
vendors for quotes would no longer have to be made)
.
- Competition would increase because purchases would be
made by experienced procurement experts.
- Procurement regulations would be more rigidly adhered to
at Pierside Procurement offices than aboard ships due to
the higher level of expertise. Thus, past horror
stories would be avoided.
- Comprehensive technical screening of all requisitions at
the Pierside Procurement Office would yield monetary
savings by crossing open purchases to stock numbers.
- Fleet readiness would be increased by the dedication of
Pierside Procurement locations for ships only. [Ref.
7:p. 21]
Additional guidance from COMNAVSUPSYSCOM stated:
- Pierside Procurement offices were to process on-site all
small purchases of $10,000 and less except workload
requiring specialized procedures.
- Pierside Procurement offices were to maintain a three
day average Procurement Administrative Lead Time (PALT)
.
PALT was defined as the number of calendar days that
elapsed from receipt of a workable purchase request
(which had been verified for open purchase by technical)
to the award of the order.
- All Pierside Procurement sites were to submit a separate
DD 1057 (Monthly Procurement Summary of Actions $25,000
or Less) for pierside operations. [Ref. 8]
Pierside Procurement was thrust into the spotlight as
the solution to the procurement "crisis." Its time had come
and Fleet Commanders, Type Commanders (TYCOMS) , Commanding
Officers, and Supply Officers generally viewed it as a "good
thing." However, the jury was still out as to whether
11
Pierside Procurement could live up to its advanced billing.
The Navy entered the Pierside Procurement era cautiously-
optimistic with the debacles of the Kitty Hawk, NAS Miramar,
and $640.00 toilet seat still firmly implanted in everyone's
mind.
B. OBJECTIVES
The primary emphasis of this study is to assess the
effectiveness of the Pierside Procurement initiative.
Questions to be answered include:
- How effectively has Pierside Procurement met the goals
established by COMNAVSUPSYSCOM?
- Is PALT the best gauge for assessing Pierside
Procurement?
- How do various sites measure PALT?
- What are the problems associated with pierside
purchasing?
- What are the benefits of pierside purchasing?
PALT is the primary method for assessing the effective-
ness of pierside operations. As previously stated, a PALT
goal of three days was initially promulgated by
COMNAVSUPSYSCOM. NAVSUP stressed maximum use of Blanket
Purchase Agreements (BPAs) and confirming orders to meet
this goal. On 1 January 1986, NAVSUP revised PALT to
include a technical screening; subsequently, the goal for
PALT, including the technical screen, was revised to five
days. The various pierside sites measure PALT using a
variety of methods. This analysis will investigate the
12
various methods of measuring PALT and determine whether PALT
is the most accurate way to assess Pierside Procurement.
Also, problems associated with the pierside operation
will be analyzed, benefits will be highlighted, and the role
of the new Automation of Procurement and Accounting Data
Entry (ADAPE) System in Pierside Procurement will be
discussed.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Based on the previously cited objectives, the following
primary research guestion is addressed in this study: How
effective is the Pierside Procurement effort and is it a
viable solution to the shipboard procurement problem? In
support of the primary research guestion, the following
subsidiary guestions are addressed:
1) What are the key aspects of the shipboard procurement
problem?
2) What were the principal problems in implementing
Pierside Procurement?
3) What are the principal benefits of Pierside
Procurement?
4) What are the present standards for measuring the
effectiveness of Pierside Procurement and are they
adeguate?
5) Will the use of the new APADE system improve the
Pierside Procurement effort?
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The vast majority of the information contained in this
research effort was obtained through on-site visits and
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interviews. On-site visits and interviews were held at
Naval Supply Centers in Norfolk, San Diego, Charleston, and
Oakland, NSC San Diego Long Beach Detachment, COMNAVSURF-
LANT (CNSL) , COMNAVSURFPAC (CNSP) , Readiness Support Group
(RSG) Norfolk, RSG Charleston, COMNAVSUPSYSCOM and fifteen
ships on both coasts. Interviews were conducted at ten
Pierside Procurement sites with supervisors, buyers
(purchasing agents), and technical personnel. Additionally,
customers were interviewed as their requisitions were being
processed at the Pierside Procurement offices. While at the
various sites, literature was obtained and research
conducted into the various aspects of the Pierside
Procurement effort.
Additionally, telephone interviews proved to be a
valuable source of information. Telephonic interviews were
held with Commander, Naval Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet
(COMNAVAIRLANT) headquarters, Commander, Submarine Force,
U.S. Atlantic Fleet headquarters, NSC Jacksonville, NSC
Puqet Sound, NRCC Philadelphia, RSG Mayport, fifteen ships
homeported in Norfolk, San Diego, and Charleston and with
thirty contractors in the areas of Norfolk, Charleston, and
San Diego.
Publications utilized included the Federal Acquisition
Regulations (FAR) , Department of Defense (DOD) FAR
Supplement, Afloat Supply Procedures (NAVSUP P-485) , and the
Navy Supply Acquisition Regulation Supplement (SUPARS 560)
.
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Federal and DOD regulations and various periodicals and
publications relating to the fields of Federal procurement
and afloat purchasing were also used.
E. SCOPE OF THE STUDY
This study focused on the Pierside Procurement
operations at the Naval Supply Centers at Norfolk, San
Diego, Charleston, and Oakland and at NSC San Diego, Long
Beach Detachment where on-site visits were conducted. These
five activities provided a good cross-section of Pierside
Procurement operations. Primary emphasis was placed on
looking at the procedures for determining PALT at the
various sites. Also, the technical screening effort, buyer
methodology, and other relevant areas were examined. Travel
and time constraints precluded visits to all Pierside
Procurement sites; however, phone conversations with NSC
Jacksonville, NSC Puget Sound, and NRCC Philadelphia
provided additional insights into their pierside operations.
Customers were queried by shipboard visits and/or phone
conversations in Norfolk, San Diego, and Charleston.
Additionally, customers were interviewed at the various
sites as they awaited requisition processing. Customer
surveys attempted to analyze the benefits and problems
associated with the Pierside Procurement initiative.
Initially, Commanding Officers were to be included as a part
of the customer surveys; however, time constraints precluded
these interviews.
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Type Commanders' (TYCOMs) inputs were solicited and
analyzed. All TYCOMs provided keen insights into pierside
operations that served their ships. CNSP and CNSL, with
approximately 175 and 200 ships respectively, were found to
monitor the program closely and have compiled numerous
statistics to assess the effectiveness of the program.
Finally, ten contractors in each geographic area of
Norfolk, San Diego, and Charleston were surveyed as to the
impact of the Pierside Procurement initiative on their
business. The companies were chosen randomly with no
concern for commodity, location, or dollar value of business
with the Navy.
The Pierside Procurement initiative is a relatively new
and dynamic program. Thus, improvements are continually
being made. Most of the research and many of the interviews
and visits were conducted in the February 1987-March 1987
timeframe; therefore, the information/data presented in this
paper are current only through the aforementioned period.
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE RESEARCH
The research is divided into five chapters. In this
chapter, the objectives have been identified, scope defined,
and methodologies disclosed.
Chapter II provides background as to the concept of
Pierside Procurement and why it was initiated. The
implementation process is also addressed. Additionally, it
briefly looks at open purchase procedures utilized before
16
Pierside Procurement and those currently being used at the
Pierside Procurement offices.
Chapter III studies the problems as seen by the various
customers, Naval Supply Centers, TYCOMs, and Inspectors.
Chapter IV offers an overall analysis of the Pierside
Procurement operation. It looks at what the program has
accomplished as compared to previously established goals.
Chapter V sets forth conclusions and recommendations
regarding the present day Pierside Procurement operation and
addresses future problems/issues that have yet to be
resolved.
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II. BACKGROUND. IMPLEMENTATION. AND PROCEDURES
A. RECENT HORROR STORIES
The past five years have proven to be turbulent times in
the realm of Government procurement. Numerous articles have
appeared concerning the Kitty Hawk, NAS Miramar, $640 toilet
seats, $435 hammers, and several other similar cases.
However, when one considers the magnitude of Government
purchases per year, the instances of "perceived" irregulari-
ties are dwarfed by the number of good , cost-efficient
actions.
Given that the Defense Department each year signs some 13
million contracts with more than 300,000 contractors, it
is not unreasonable to suppose that an occasional horror
story will turn up despite the best efforts and
intentions. The irony is that virtually every case of
serious fraud and abuse which the media have glorified of
late has been uncovered by the Defense Department's own
Office of the Inspector General. [Ref. 9:p. 20]
One irregularity is too many, but with the sensationalism of
the press and Congress, it seems as if everyone dealing with
procurement in the Department of Defense and industry is a
cheat, thief, or crook. Once in a while, a mistake is going
to be made and if the press would report the whole story the
perceived irregularities would be more in line with the
actual magnitude of the problem.
A case in point is the $640.00 toilet seat. Senator
Cohen was informed by a contractor from the state of
Washington that the Government was paying $34,560.00 for 54
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toilet covers. To the typical Midwesterner, this purchase
was simply outrageous because he could go down to K-Mart and
buy a toilet seat for $10.00. However, this "toilet seat"
was actually a heavy molded plastic cover for the entire
toilet system of the P-3 aircraft. (The toilet seats,
themselves, cost only $9.37.) Lockheed, the manufacturer of
the molded plastic cover, had made only a 13.4% profit on
the cover, but eventually lowered the price to $100.00
apiece and gave the Department of Defense a $29,165.00
rebate. [Refs. 9:p. 19; 10:p. 23]
Another case is the NAS Miramar incident. NAS Miramar
made the "news" because the Navy procured ashtrays for their
E-2C aircraft at a price of $659.00. The ashtrays, which
had 11 moving parts and took 13 hours to build, were
supplied to the Navy in 1983 by Grumman. It was later
discovered that an alternate source for the ashtray, the
Naval Air Rework Facility (NARF) at North Island,
California, had quoted a price of $1,288.81 for the same
ashtray on 1 June 1985. Admittedly, the Navy made some
mistakes in the buy (e.g., buying the ashtray in lots of
ones or twos and having them manufactured out of normal
cycles) , but Grumman had in fact used Government-approved
pricing procedures. [Ref. 4:p. 88]
The ramifications from the $659.00 ashtray were
attention-grabbing and far-reaching. Three officers were
relieved of their duties at NAS Miramar for irregularities
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in "the purchase of spare parts during the period 1981 to
the present [June 1985] and the disregard of a September
1984 Contract Management Review Report." [Ref. 4: p. 88]
Although the base commander was reinstated to his former
position, the message was loud and clear— irregularities in
the area of procurement were not going to be tolerated at
any level. [Ref. 4:p. 88]
Once again, spare parts pricing became an issue.
Although Grumman made very little profit from the ashtrays,
they issued full credit to the Navy. More importantly, it
became apparent that the procurement process was flawed and
needed an overhaul. As Robert J. Myers, Senior President,
Grumman Corporation, said, "Government and industry must
work together to solve problems of the high cost of spares."
[Ref. 4:p. 88]
These two incidents helped propel Navy procurement into
the front pages of the nation's newspapers. The "final
blow" and the case that provided the impetus for the
Pierside Procurement initiative was the USS Kitty Hawk
incident. In June of 1985, Petty Officer First Class Robert
Jackson "blew the whistle" on the USS Kitty Hawk. Jackson,
who served as an internal auditor onboard Kitty Hawk,
collected 1100 pages of notes and documents in what he
described as " . . . appalling acts of waste, fraud, auditing
forgeries, and altered books in the handling of spare parts
and other equipment." [Ref. 11: p. 18] Jackson claimed that
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the supply system contained ". . .no checks or balances, no
accountability. It's a breeding ground for crooks." [Ref.
ll:p. 18]
Jackson contended that the careless handling of supplies
made it possible for a ring of international dealers in
aircraft parts to acquire more than $5 million in F-14 spare
parts and smuggle them to Iran. The smuggling was easy,
said Jackson, because of the ship's "... flawed supply
system with minimal or no internal accounting." With one of
the carrier's aviation storekeeper's among the seven people
originally arrested for the smuggling scheme, Jackson and
Congressman Jim Bales of San Diego believed the supply
abuses and smuggling scheme to be related. [Ref. 3: p. 19]
This collection of procurement horror stories lead the
Department of Defense to take a long hard look at the way it
did business. Many initiatives were implemented to correct
the wave of negative publicity that seemed to appear daily
in the front pages of our newspapers. Some of the Navy's
initiatives included: Buy Our Spare Parts Smart (BOSS)
,
Pricef ighter, the Pricing Hotline, improved training,
improved policy guidance in the form of the Navy Supply
Acquisition Regulation Supplement (SUPARS 560) , inspection
oversight, procurement automation in the form of APADE,
improved staffing, better and more competition, active
pursuit of refunds from overpriced spare parts and, finally,
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Pierside Procurement. Though the details of the
aforementioned initiatives are beyond the scope of this
thesis, it should be noted that the Navy has actively
pursued improvement in the area of procurement.
B. WHAT IS PIERSIDE PROCUREMENT?
Pierside Procurement actually began at NSC Norfolk in
February 1985; however, its implementation fleet-wide began
in October 1985. As previously mentioned, this was one of
the initiatives started in response to past horror stories.
Procurement of material outside of the Navy stock system
(open purchases) has consistently been a difficult area for
shipboard personnel and one that needed immediate
improvement. Centralized procurement in the form of
Pierside Procurement was initiated as the remedy to the
shipboard procurement problem.
Why Pierside Procurement? An official at NAVSUP said,
The reason for Pierside Procurement is obvious. Our
shipboard Supply Officers are having problems making
purchases and we cannot afford any more headlines.
Experts at central locations are better equipped to make
the difficult buys than our shipboard Supply Officers.
Opinions among TYCOM representatives, Naval Supply Center
representatives, Pierside Procurement supervisors, and
shipboard Supply Officers vary as to why we have Pierside
Procurement, but the two most common responses were in
consonance with the NAVSUP official's opinion:
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1) Shipboard Supply Officers cannot make open purchases
and "experts" are better equipped to handle the
problems.
2) We do not need any more horror stories.
In fact, of the over forty ships surveyed and Supply
Officers questioned, 97% of them said they were relieved to
get rid of the purchasing function. They felt that Pierside
Procurement offices were better equipped to handle purchase
functions due to a lack of personnel and expertise aboard
ship. Even the Supply Officers of the larger ships such as
submarine tenders, destroyer tenders, and aircraft carriers,
though they were not totally "sold" on Pierside Procurement,
emphasized that they did not- want the purchasing function
returned.
The following quote alludes to the previously cited
reasons for the implementation of Pierside Procurement.
. . . . Wide-spread media attention and Congressional
interest in the material procurement issue were sparked by
the NAS Miramar E-2C ashtray procurement incident and the
JAG [Judge Advocate General] Manual investigation aboard
Kitty Hawk. . . . The CNOs [Chief of Naval Operations]
endorsement on the Kitty Hawk JAG Manual investigation
tasked NAVSUP to provide dedicated pierside contracting
support for fleet units beginning 1 November 1985. . . .
Over the past decade, procurement actions by afloat units
have grown in both scope and volume far exceeding the
original intent of NAVSUP in delegating procurement
authority to afloat Supply Corps officers—to procure
emergency supplies or services to meet a ship's
operational requirements and to pay port services costs
incurred while operating outside of the United States
. . . problems in afloat procurement were well known prior
to their being surfaced in the media at Miramar and
onboard Kitty Hawk. These problems are not unique to
aircraft carriers or air stations . . . COMNAVAIRLANT as
well as other Type Commander's Supply Management
Inspections (SMIs) have repeatedly identified a litany of
procedural errors and flagrant abuses; failure to compete
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or justify sole source procurements, splitting purchase
orders to exceed procurement authority limitations,
failure to document price reasonableness, no justification
for procurement of material available from standard stock,
procurement actions with large businesses, . . . failure
to utilize federal supply schedules, etc. These errors
and abuses . . . have served as the catalysts for change
in afloat procurement. [Ref. 12: p. 95]
The above statement by COMNAVAIRLANT nicely summarizes the
reasons for Pierside Procurement. Pierside Procurement was
implemented to try to solve the aforementioned myriad of
procurement problems aboard ship. Centralizing the
shipboard procurement function at Naval Supply Centers and
Naval Regional Contracting Centers was expected to yield
quick and positive results.
The Pierside Procurement initiative was started with the
intent of transferring the bulk of the Navy's 410,000 open
purchase actions per year to the pierside offices. An
initial sampling of perceptions on what this initiative
would involve included:
In September 1985, the Naval Supply Systems Command
implemented a plan to establish Pierside Purchasing
Offices within walking distance of Fleet Customers. The
main objective of this initiative was to provide
dedicated, convenient, responsive purchasing support to
the fleet thereby relieving shipboard personnel of the
burden of processing open purchase requirements. Pierside
Purchasing operations are currently being performed at 11
NAVSUP activities worldwide. [Ref. 13]
. . . . The main objective of Pierside Purchasing is to
relieve ships of the burden of processing open purchase
requirements while ensuring they receive the responsive
purchasing support required to maintain readiness and meet
operational commitments. [Ref. 8]
Purpose of pierside contracting services is to relieve
ships of unnecessary contracting workload while continuing
service within reasonable lead times. Pierside
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contracting services will . . . dramatically increase
shore activity responsiveness to afloat purchase
requisitions. Concept envisions fully manned trailers
with technical library, phones, etc. , best positioned for
direct access by ship personnel processing ship
requisitions exclusively. . . . [Ref. 6]
Since 1 October 1985, the Navy has changed its way of
delegating procurement authority with a goal of increasing
competition and improving procurement administration. A
major facet of the changing environment has been the
establishment of pierside procurement offices to better
support afloat requirements. . . . These ashore
facilities provide dedicated and experienced procurement
specialists who are familiar with the existing commercial
market and have proven to produce lower costs, better
products, and shorter administrative leadtimes. [Ref. 14]
Pierside Procurement was initiated by NAVSUP . . . for the
purpose of assisting forces afloat by providing
expeditious handling of all "high priority" ships' non-
standard hardware requirements less than $10,000. The
main thrust of NSC Norfolk's Pierside Procurement is to
improve responsiveness of procurement support to the fleet
by reducing the Procurement Action Lead Time to process
the requirement. Additionally, this dedicated support
would relieve ship's supply personnel of the burden of
processing open purchase requisitions while still
providing dedicated and responsive procurement support.
[Ref. 15]
C. PROPOSED IMPLEMENTATION OF PIERSIDE PROCUREMENT
NAVSUP initially developed a four-phased plan to effect
the smooth transition of shipboard procurement functions to
the Pierside Procurement offices at the Naval Supply Centers
and Naval Regional Contracting Centers. The plan was
predicated upon the establishment of local offices within
walking distance of the ships and upon the hiring of an
additional 3 60 purchasing, CMR (Contract Management Review)
,
and technical personnel to insure "... that the fleet
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receives the dedicated responsive purchasing support it
requires." [Ref. 16] (See Appendix A)
Phase I called for the establishment of temporary/or
expansion of permanent Pierside Purchasing offices.
Initially, 60 personnel from shore support branches were to
be reassigned to these offices. The estimated completion
date of Phase I was 15 October 1985. Amplifying
instructions from NAVSUP stated:
Execution of Pierside Purchasing by 15 October 1985 may
necessitate requesting TYCOM/NAVSTA [Naval Station]
assistance to obtain office space, telephones, desks, and
other support equipment. Funding for set up and initial
operations of pierside offices will be provided in your FY
86 FOP [Financial Operating Plans] . It is recognized that
reassignment of personnel to staff Pierside Purchasing may
temporarily result in increased PALT for shore contracting
requirements; nevertheless, it is incumbent upon us to
make every effort to ensure the fleet receives the
dedicated, responsive contracting support it requires to
maintain readiness and meet operational commitments.
[Ref. 16]
Phase II involved the completion of permanent offices
and the hiring of 120 additional personnel. A completion
date of 31 December 1985 was anticipated.
Phase III was the expansion of Pierside Procurement
offices and the hiring of 100 additional personnel. The
targeted completion date was 31 March 1986.
The final phase, Phase IV, was the completion of
pierside office manning and expansion. The scheduled
completion date was 30 July 1986. Additionally, Naval
Supply Centers and Naval Regional Contracting Centers were
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tasked to advise NAVSUP of the details concerning the
completion of each of the four implementation phases.
Resources required for FY 86 were $7,082 million
(including labor) and a total end strength of 360 personnel
for purchasing, Contract Management Reviews (CMRs) , and
technical functions. (See Appendix B)
The various field contracting activities handled the
proposed four phased implementation in different ways. A
brief look at NSC Norfolk's and NSC San Diego's
implementation procedures for Phases I and II provide a
flavor for how these procedures differed.
1. NSC Norfolk
In response to Phase I requirements, NSC Norfolk
established three sites: one at Building W-135, one onboard
Emory S. Land (AS-39) at Pier 20, and one at the Naval
Amphibious Base (NAB) Little Creek. Amplifying guidance was
provided regarding the role of Pierside Procurement offices
in the open purchase process.
NSC Norfolk implemented Phase II by announcing the
following expanded facilities/services as of 30 December
1985:
- Building 73, a trailer located in the vicinity of the
carrier piers, would be open for business.
- Building 2 04, USS Emory S. Land T-shed, would be
utilized for Pierside Procurement in the vicinity of the
Destroyer and Submarine (D&S) Piers.
- Building 1216, NAB Little Creek, would be used for
Little Creek based ships.
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2. NSC San Diego
NSC San Diego's buying responsibilities involved
three primary locations—Naval Station, San Diego; Naval Air
Station, North Island; and Submarine Base, Point Loma. In
response to Phase I, NSC San Diego established Pierside
Procurement locations at NAS North Island, Building 334;
Naval Station, Building 322; and at Building 140, Submarine
Base.
Phase II saw permanent pierside offices established
in Building 116 at the Naval Station and at Building 652 at
North Island. Building 137 at the Submarine Base Point Loma
was made available but could not be occupied until mid-
January of 1986.
*
Amplifying information provided to NAVSUP indicated
the Naval Station site was not within walking distance of
the piers, all three sites required initial outfitting and
renovation to make them "administratively functional and
marginally habitable," and that forty-five applicants for
the twenty-seven purchasing agents' jobs would be screened
by 31 December 1985. [Ref. 17]
Phases III and IV were partially implemented and
revised several times due to personnel and funding
constraints. A closer look at the problem will take place
in Chapter III.
28
D. SMALL PURCHASE PROCEDURES
1. Introduction
The advent of Pierside Procurement brought with it a
whole new set of rules and regulations for the customer to
follow. The Naval Supply Centers that were to house
Pierside Procurement offices promulgated amplifying
instructions to TYCOMs via messages, Naval Supply Center
Flashes, and conferences concerning the new procedures to be
followed and the services to be available. The Naval Supply
Centers and the Naval Regional Contracting Centers each
handled the implementation differently and not entirely in
accordance with NAVSUP guidance. For example, NSC San
Diego's guidance was:
Initial Pierside Procurement support will encompass only
those requirements valued less than $1,000, which can be
placed on Blanket Purchase Agreements (BPAs) . NSC plans
to expand range of Pierside Purchase support in the near
future as additional resources (personnel and equipment)
become available. [Ref. 18]
Being the prototype site for Pierside Procurement,
NSC Norfolk's initial policy was much more in-depth. It
stated:
NSC procurement outlets will process Bearer Issue Group I
and II Nonstandard Requisitions for supplies/services for
afloat units, provide procurement and technical assistance
and serve as a drop point for routine procurement
requirements . . . the purpose of procurement outlets will
be to assist customers in identification of standard stock
alternatives through technical screening and to accomplish
procurement actions for items determined to require this




The preferred methods for making open purchases in
order of preference are:
1) Blanket Purchase Agreements
2) Imprest Fund
3) Purchase Orders.
Pierside Procurement offices utilize the above three methods
for making open purchases and additionally utilize the




"The Blanket Purchase Agreement (BPA) method of
small purchase is a simplified procedure of establishing
'charge accounts' with qualified sources of supply to cover
anticipated small purchases of the same general category."
[Ref. 20:13.201] BPAs eliminate the need to issue
individual purchase orders by providing a means of placing a
purchase request by making an oral call or informal
memorandum. The afloat Supply Officer often has access to
the BPAs negotiated by Naval Supply Centers, Naval Supply
Depots (NSDs) , Naval Shipyards (NSYs) , and Naval Air
Stations (NASs) . Billing is also much easier because the
activity holding the BPA receives a monthly bill itemizing
each payment. [Ref. 21:72-6A]
Reference refers to paragraph citations for the Navy
Supply Acquisition Regulation Supplement (SUPAR) . Hence-
forth, all references to SUPAR will denote paragraph
citations vice page numbers.
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A BPA does not preclude competition if the BPA call
is in excess of $1,000 nor does it preclude distributing
purchases if the call is less than $1000. Justification for
sole source requirements and small business set-asides still
remain in effect.
4 . Imprest Fund
The imprest fund provides a simple and economical
method of purchase. Imprest funds are similar to petty cash
funds utilized by most businesses. In its simplest form it
is cash paid to a vendor at the time purchase transactions
occur and to which reimbursements are made on a revolving
basis. The fund consists of a set dollar limit of cash and
dealer's invoices.
Purchases effected will not exceed $150 per
transaction or $3 00 in an emergency. The maximum amount of
the fund, excluding ships, shall be estimated monthly
payments (not to exceed $5,000) or $500. Shipboard imprest
funds shall not exceed $1,000 onboard ships with Supply
Corps Officers or $500 for ships without Supply Corps
Officers. [Ref. 20:13.402]
The impetus for the imprest fund is that most purchase
organizations, including the government, have found that
the cost to process a small dollar value purchase action
through the purchasing branch far exceeds the value of the
item being purchased. [Ref. 22 :p. 27]
The imprest fund is much more involved than the
above synopsis, but the relevant points to consider have
been addressed. Imprest funds should be carefully monitored
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due to the numerous controls required to prevent abuse. In
fact, several TYCOMs actually discourage the use of imprest
funds. If an imprest fund is not established onboard, the
imprest fund of the Naval Supply Center, Naval Station or
tender is normally available for use. [Ref. 21:72-7]
5. Purchase Orders
The purchase order is the basic tool of small
purchasing and constitutes ". . .an offer by the Government
to buy certain supplies and services in accordance with
specified terms and conditions contained in the order."
[Ref. 20:13.501] There are two types of purchase orders:
1) Unilateral purchase order—this is an offer by the
Government to buy certain goods or services upon specified
terms and conditions. The contractor accepts the offer by
providing the supplies/services or performing the work to
the point where performance has occurred. The contractor
is not legally obligated to perform. Acceptance of the DD
Form 1155 is indicated by the aforementioned methods of
acceptance.
2) A bilateral purchase order is accepted in writing by
the contractor. The contractor signs the reverse of the
DD 1155.
6. Delivery Orders
Delivery Orders are calls placed against existing
contracts and can reduce the time and the cost of the buying
process. Frequently, these orders are placed against
indefinite delivery contracts. The indefinite delivery
contract is based on a contract negotiated by a supply
activity or NRCC with a commercial vendor. "This contract
sets forth the terms and conditions under which the vendor
will deliver specified supplies or services in response to
32
orders." [Ref. 21:72-6A] The ship specifies the time of
delivery and quantity required in the order.
Open purchases must be documented on a small
purchase documentation sheet. (See Appendix C) The open
purchase bid sheet must be filed in the ship's purchase
documentation file for future audit trials for Supply
Management Inspections and Procurement Management Reviews.
E. SHIPBOARD PROCEDURES FOR AN OPEN PURCHASE
1 . Purchase Actions Before Pierside Procurement
Supply Officers were the primary contracting
officers prior to the issuance of new policy guidance in the
form of SUPARS 560.
The senior Supply Corps Officer of a major fleet, type
commander or ship, the Commanding Officer of ships without
a Supply Corps Officer attached . . . are hereby appointed
contracting officers of the Naval Supply Systems Command
. . . the contracting officer has the authority to
contract for supplies and services as authorized. . . .
Actions by contracting officers beyond the scope of this
authority may result in both disciplinary action and
personal liability. [Ref. 23:3084 2 ]
The shipboard Supply Officer had the Afloat Supply
Procedures, NAVSUP—P-485 as a guide. It spelled out in
detail the Supply Officers' obligations, limitations and
methodology in the open purchase of material. Open
purchases could be made only when requirements could not be
obtained from mandatory Government sources of supply which
2Reference refers to paragraph citation for NAVSUP P-
485. Henceforth, all references to NAVSUP P-485 will
denote paragraph citations vice page numbers.
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are listed below in descending order of priority: [Ref.
20:13.103]
1) Defense/Federal Supply systems for material assigned a
National Stock Number (NSN)
2) Excess property from other agencies
3) Federal Prison Industries
4) National Industries for the Blind or Other Severely
Handicapped
5) Mandatory GSA Federal Supply Schedule Contracts; and
6) Optional GSA Federal Supply Schedule Contracts.
An open purchase action was initiated by an end-user
with the submission of a NAVSUP 12 50-1. Upon receipt of the
1250-1, the Supply Officer (or designated individual)
checked the document for dollar-value and completeness.
Open purchases were only permitted up to a threshold of
$2,500 ($10,000 in the case of Supply Officers aboard larger
ships). Emergency requirements from $2500 to $10,000 were
authorized provided: [Ref. 23:3085]
1) there is [was] an emergency requirement for authorized
supplies and services and scheduled operations will
[would] not permit procurement through shore-based
supply/contracting activities
2) all such purchases are [were] supported by the
contracting officer's written determination setting forth
the facts and circumstances justifying the exercise of
such authority. . . .
3) all transactions are [were] made by an approved small
purchase method provided for immediate delivery
4) the requirements . . . regarding competition over
$1,000 and the solicitation of small businesses are [were]
adhered to.
After the requisition had been accepted, it had to
be screened against availability from regular stock
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channels. In other words, it had to be technically screened
to ensure that a stock numbered item was not available.
Aboard a small combatant or amphibious ship this usually
entailed (depending on the material) cross-referencing the
material to a stock number by means of the Master Cross-
Reference List (MCRL) and/or the Management List-Navy (ML-
N) . Upon the determination that the material was, in fact,
an open purchase, the Supply Officer had to determine if it
was on a "not to be purchased list."
After the above steps had been accomplished, the
Supply Officer had a myriad of other criteria to consider
before the required supplies or services could be purchased
in the local market area:
- If the purchase exceeded $1,000, three bids had to be
solicited from qualified suppliers to assure that awards
were made to the advantage of the government. Quotes
were usually solicited orally.
- If the purchase was less than $1,000, no competition was
required if the price was considered to be "fair and
reasonable.
"
- Any purchase less than $10,000, utilizing small purchase
procedures, had to be made from a small business (less
than 500 employees)
.
- The purchase of the supplies or services had to be
authorized by current directives.
- The supplies or services were not available at the local
supply support activity or would not be available in the
required time frames.
- The contracting officer had to be familiar with the
local market areas.
- There were sufficient supply department personnel to
accomplish the additional workload involved.
35
- All transactions were by an approved small purchase
method and allowance for delivery within 3 days. [Ref.
23:3085]
After the above had been accomplished, the Supply
Officer was ready to make the buy. The Supply Department
prepared a DD Form 1155—Order for Supplies or
Services/Request for Quotations—and the award was made.
Additionally, the Supply Officer had to consider other
socio-economic programs such as minority businesses, women-
owned businesses, the Buy American Act, and spreading
similar business among different suppliers.
Since the great majority of purchasing aboard ship
fell into the small purchase category, it was incumbent upon
the Supply Officer to ensure small purchase issues were
addressed. Issues considered were:
- For purchases under $1,000, purchases had to be
distributed equitably over a period of time among
qualified buyers. Repeat orders should not have been
placed with the previous supplier if possible. [Ref.
20:13.106]
- Price reasonableness had to be determined for purchases
less than $1,000. Since price competition was not
required for purchases under $1,000 the Supply Officer
had to determine if the price was "fair and reasonable."
- All purchases with an anticipated dollar value of
$10,000 or less were considered to be small business
set-asides and should have been placed with small
business concerns. A small business concern was [is]
"... a concern, . . . independently owned and
operated, not dominant in the field . . . and is [was]
qualified as a small business under certain
criteria. . . . [Ref. 20:13.105] For purchases up to
$10,000, a dealer was [is] considered to be a small
business if it had 500 employees or less and was
supplying any domestically produced or manufactured
product.
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- For purchases over $1,000, a reasonable number of
quotations had to be solicited. Usually three quotes
from qualified supplies to ensure competition was
reasonable. For small purchases, reasonable competition
could usually be obtained from the local market. Two
suppliers not included in the previous quotation should
have been solicited. If only one quote was received and
it was determined to be "fair and reasonable," no
additional quotations were required. If only one source
was solicited, a sole source justification from the
customer should have been included in the request.
[Ref. 20:13.106]
- "Foreign items should not be [have been] procured unless
the necessary decisions of exception and required
documentation have [had] been made prior to award."
[Ref. 20:13.107-2] The Buy American Act required that
only domestic end products could be acquired for public
use. Exceptions included:
1) Supplies that were for use outside the U.S.
2) Items that were not available in the U.S. in
sufficient and reasonably available quantities.
The restrictions of the Buy American Act did not apply if it
was determined that the cost of a domestic item was
unreasonable. The determination was made by multiplying the
foreign quote (including duty) by 6% and determining if it
was lower than the domestic quote. If the domestic quote
was higher, then multiply the foreign quote less duty, by
50%. If the domestic price was still higher, award was made
to the foreign supplier.
Thus it is obvious, the Supply Officer had to expend
much energy, manpower and time to make an award before
Pierside Procurement. Now pierside offices ensure the
aforementioned myriad of policies and procedures are adhered




"The supply officer is responsible for the receipt,
inspection, identification, and distribution of all incoming
stores. ..." [Ref. 23:4000] Additionally, he is
responsible for the processing of receipt papers and all
associated documents. The majority of all shipboard
receipts, whether open purchased by the ship or acquired by
the Pierside Procurement office, will be direct delivery.
The DD 250 is a multi-purpose form that is used
".
. . principally to provide evidence of inspection or
acceptance at either the material source or its destination,
to substantiate contract payments." [Ref. 23:4115] The
Federal Acquisition Regulation prescribes use of the DD 250
for delivery of materials procured under Government
contract. The DD 2 50 can also be used when ashore
activities have procured material for shipboard units using
a DD Form 1155. When material is furnished directly to an
afloat unit by a commercial vendor, a technical representa-
tive will inspect the material and a storekeeper and the
representative will complete blocks 17, 21, and 22 of the DD
Form 1155.
3 Bill Payment
Once the material is inspected and accepted, the
dealer's invoice must be paid. "Under the provisions of the
Prompt Payment Act (Public Law 97-177) , federal agencies are
required to pay interest penalties for the late payment of a
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proper dealer's invoice." [Ref. 23:4335] The Prompt
Payment Act is an attempt to foster better business
relationships with suppliers, improve efficiency, and reduce
the costs of goods and services. A dealer's invoice should
be forwarded to the appropriate paying office within 5 days
after inspection and acceptance of material. (If a discount
is being offered, a "Discount" label will be attached to the
upper left corner of the dealer's invoice and it will be
forwarded for payment immediately.) [Ref. 23:4335] The
"clock" starts to run for the purposes of prompt payment
from the later of the acceptance of material or the receipt
of a correct invoice. The vendor must be notified within 15
days of any apparent error with the invoice. After the
acceptance of the material or receipt of a corrected
invoice, the ship has 30 days to process the bill and send
it to the paying activity. The Act specifies that the
interest payment will be paid automatically if the "correct"
procedures are not followed.
A recent initiative has been the implementation of
the "fast pay" procedure. Fast pay procedures may be used
in purchases that do not exceed $25,000 and should be issued
on a DD Form 1155. This method expedites payments to
commercial vendors with the goal of encouraging faster
delivery to the Government. "Payments are based on the
shipment data included with the vendor's invoice which is
submitted directly to the paying office designated in the
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purchase document." [Ref. 23:308 3] The supplier must agree
to replace, correct, or repair supplies not received at the
destination, damaged or not in compliance with the purchase
requirement, if notified within 60 days of shipment. The
receiving activity (ship) must notify the purchasing
activity if the material is not received within 30 days
after the required delivery date or 10 days after receiving
nonconforming material. Additionally, notification of
receipt must be supplied within 10 days after receiving
material that conforms to the requirements of the
order/call
.
F. PIERSIDE PROCUREMENT PROCEDURES
1. General
Thouqh the procedures varied at the five Pierside
Procurement offices visited, their qoals were the same—to
provide the customer with the most expeditious and efficient
service possible. This section shall examine the procedures
that are "common" to Pierside Procurement offices and point
out relevant differences discovered durinq on-site visits.
Note that Pierside Procurement is a dynamic area and changes
to improve services are constantly being made. (Visits to






The process starts onboard ship with the
determination of a requirement by an end-user division. The
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end-user then submits a 1250-1 to the Supply Department
indicating the requirement. Often the end-user has done his
"homework" and indicates one or more recommended sources.
The ship should then do a technical screen to ensure that
the material is not carried in the stock system. It is
imperative that the end-user supply adequate descriptive and
technical data prior to submission of the 1348-6 or 1149 to
the pierside office. If the item is not ADP or habitability
related, is less than $10,000, is not on a "don't buy" list,
and does not have a stock number, then it is a candidate for
Pierside Procurement. The Supply Officer then prepares a
1348-6 or 1149 depending on the requirement. (An 1149 is
generally used for services.) Usually the end-user division
provides someone to take the requisition through the
processing procedure at the Pierside Procurement office.
3 . Customer Service
At the majority of the pierside sites, the first
person that handles the requisition is someone from the
Naval Supply Center customer service section. (Exceptions
include San Dieqo which utilizes an input clerk and the
smaller pierside operations such as the Naval Supply Center
San Diego Long Beach Detachment.) This is where PALT is
supposed to start—as soon as a ready requisition gets to
the Pierside Procurement office. The customer service
representative (or input clerk) checks the requisition for
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completeness and depending on the activity may or may not
reject the requisition if it is not complete.
Next the process varies greatly.
- NSC Norfolk—The customer service representative enters
the requisition into UADPS (Uniform Automated Data
Processing System) . He/she telecopies the requisition
(Issue Groups I or II) up to NSC technical on the sixth
floor of the Naval Supply Center. (Issue Group III is
hand-carriad to NSC Technical.) PALT has not started.
(Customer Service personnel are at three of the four
Pierside Procurement sites.)
- NSC San Diego—PALT starts with the delivery of the
requisition to the input clerk. The clerk enters the
requisitions into an IBM PC (personal computer) and
sends the customer with the requisition to NSC technical
which is located a few feet away.
- NSC Charleston—First, the customer logs the requisition
in himself, and gives the requisition to the customer
service representative. (NSC Charleston calculates PALT
in an unusual manner which will be addressed in Chapter
III.) The customer service representative, after
checking the document for completeness, hand-carries the
requisition to NSC technical which is located in the
same office.
4 . Technical
Technical procedures, though essentially the same,
vary in the methods of accomplishment.
- NSC Norfolk—The technical section is located on the
sixth floor of NSC Norfolk. After the requisition is
telecopied to the sixth floor from any of the four
pierside sites, it is entered into a log (bearer walk-
throughs only) by a clerk. It maintains BD status
(requisition is being delayed due to need to verify
requirements) while in technical. One of six technical
personnel dedicated to Pierside Procurement picks up the
requisitions from an "in" box and assigns them to
technicians. They are assigned based on "familiarity,"
but as Mr. Wes Cherry, NSC technical supervisor said,
"We don't have any experts. We can't specialize because
we must be able to respond to the customer. We lose
flexibility if we specialize." After they are assigned
to the technicians, an attempt is made to cross the
requisitions to National Stock Numbers. (Initially
statistics were kept on the number of requisitions
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crossed to National Stock Numbers; however, these
statistics are no longer compiled at most NSCs/NRCCs.)
Mr. Cherry said, "The primary methods used to cross
requisitions to stock numbers are via the Master Cross
Reference List (MCRL) and the Cross Reference File
(CRF)." If the requisition is not crossed to an NSN, it
is assigned BV status (item procured and on contract for
direct shipment to consignee) and sent via telecopier to
the customer service representative. She passes it on
to the "expeditor" for entry into APADE and
distribution. If it crossed to an NSN, it is assigned
BG status (part has been crossed to an NSN) and sent
back to customer service. If BG status is assigned, the
ship has the option of ordering the NSN or submitting a
certification signed by the Commanding Officer that the
identified NSN cannot be attained (See Appendix D) or a
certification that the standard stock number is not
suitable. (See Appendix E)
NSC technical can also cancel a requisition (CA
status) for lack of information. If CA status is
invoked, NSC Norfolk gives the ship the option of
returning with the same requisition with additional
information and suffix Code A. If cancelled, the
requisition is sent to the ship or picked up. The ship
is notified of a cancellation by message or phone call .
NSC Charleston—The technical section of the main
Pierside Procurement office is located in the same
office as the customer service representative and the
buyers. The customer service representative simply
carries the requisition over to the technicians for
screening. The technician screens it via the MCRL and
CRF and if a stock number cannot be found, he enters it
into the Inventory Location Service (ILS) ia computer.
Most importantly, the ILS gives the Federal Supply Code
for Manufacturers (FSCM) and procurement history. The
technician can also cancel the requisition, but usually
opts to call the ship for additional information. If
the number is crossed to an NSN, the requisition will be
sent back to the customer service representative and
automatically ordered. If the item is to be procured
via Pierside Procurement, it is sent back to the
customer service representative where it is time-
stamped. The customer service representative then loads
it into the computer and passes it to the Pierside
Procurement office supervisor for distribution.
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5. Buyers
A requisition is usually assigned to a buyer by the
supervisor. In the case of NSC Norfolk, an "expeditor"
assigns the requisition to a buyer after screening for
"don't buy" items. Assignments are generally made by the
number of requisitions sitting on the buyer's desk. For
example, NSC Charleston's goal is to keep the number of
requisitions on a buyer's desk to 75 or less and have no
requisition older than 15 days.
Once a requisition is assigned to a buyer, a certain
methodology is followed. Competition, socio-economic goals,
Military/Federal Specifications, and a "fair and reasonable"
price are just a few of the considerations a buyer must
assess. A buyer must evaluate the same criteria the Supply
Officer had to consider in Part II. E. For example:
If the purchase is in excess of $1,000, the buyer,
based on experience, will go to known sources for
competition. One of the sources (or more if listed on the
requisition) is usually the recommended source from the
customer. In most cases, if the low bidder is not the
source recommended by the ship, the buyer will go back to
the ship to see if the low bidder is providing an "equal"
item. NSC Charleston provides the ship with a brochure of
the "equal" part to permit the ship to make a proper
determination. "Generally, the minimum acceptable
competitive purchase description is the identification of a
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requirement by use of a brand name followed by the words 'or
equal'." [Ref. 20:13.104-2] If the ship replies that the
low bidder is not an "equal," they must provide
justification (DD 1784) siqned by the Commanding Officer.
As one Pierside Procurement supervisor stated, "Our buyers
are not technical personnel, how can they make a determina-
tion if a part is an 'equal'." Though the buyers do solicit
the help of their technical sections, the customer makes the
ultimate decision and must justify it.
Buyers at Pierside Procurement offices are required
to use small businesses for all purchases because, "All open
market purchases with an anticipated dollar value of $10,000
or less are considered to be small business—small purchase
set-asides and must be made with small business concerns."
[Ref. 23:13.105] It is a matter of routine for the Pierside
Procurement buyers to know the small businesses in their
local market as they deal with them everyday; however, if
the buyer deems a small business bid to be outrageous, a
"buy" can be placed with a large business if: [Ref.
22:13.105]
(1) ... the contracting officer determines there is no
reasonable chance of obtaining quotations from two (2) or
more responsible small business concerns that will be
competitive in terms of market price, quality, and
delivery.
(2) ... you don't receive a quotation from a small
business concern at a reasonable price, or a quotation
which meets your required delivery date and/or purchase
description/specification, then you may dissolve the small
business—small purchase set-aside. . . .
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After the buyer has fulfilled the prescribed
requirements and has completed the small purchase
documentation sheet, the award is about to be made. At NSC
Norfolk only contracting officers can make any award,
including BPAs. Buyers at Norfolk can only make entries
into the APADE system and until Phase III is implemented
they cannot even approve BPA buys. (As of March 1987, only
NSC Norfolk and NSC Puget Sound have APADE. All other
Pierside Procurement sites are scheduled to get APADE in the
near future.) The contracting officers approve all buys.
At NSC Charleston buyers can award any BPA less than $1000,
but the contracting officers approve all other awards.
After the award is approved, all paperwork is sent to a
clerk for typing (DD 1155) , distribution (including the all
important copy to the ship) and filing.
6. Material Receipt
After contract award, Pierside Procurement is, for
all intents and purposes, finished with the procurement
process. Material is received onboard ships and pierside
offices only hear about receipts if there is a problem. In
other words, in the majority of the cases, pierside offices
do not know if material is received or not. NSC Charleston
has several innovative ideas that should prove to alleviate
this potential problem. First, they have initiated
"Roadrunner" Service. The "Roadrunner" truck picks up
requisitions twice daily from the pierside office, goes to
46
the contractor and gets the material, and delivers the
material to the ship the same day. Thus, material is
assured of being delivered. Similarly, NSC Charleston is
about to embark on a program of "centralized receiving."
This concept envisions having two contract administrators at
the pierside site monitor the receipt and delivery of
material to ships.
7. APADE
APADE is a standardized procurement system that
automates the entire acquisition process.
APADE provides state-of-the-art buyer support services. A
full range of document preparation services is available.
The system utilizes electronic filing, mailing and
signature techniques to control document flow. ... It
integrates the latest in laser printing technology to
provide real-time contract output or large volume batch
work as required. The broad range of competition and
technical support data available to a buyer on-line is a
dramatic break-through. . .
.
[Ref . 24:p. 17]
A discussion of Pierside Procurement operations would not be
complete without the introduction of APADE. Implementation
is presently (June 1987) ongoing at NSC Norfolk and NSC
Puget Sound using a four phase approach that ". . . is
intended to prevent disruption in the current daily
procurement operation and to minimize anxiety and confusion
among users." [Ref. 25:p. 40]
APADE is accomplished through the functioning of
seven subsystems. The system is not complete until the













APADE will provide the buyers with tools not
previously available to them. One of these "tools" is
APADE ' s ability to automatically provide buyers with a
Purchase Request Data Sheet that lists the last ten
commercial sources previously used to procure the item,
including the address, phone number, and point of contact.
The Data Sheet also contains purchase and price histories
gathered by all APADE activities. APADE also possesses the
ability to generate hard-copies of procurement documents.
When all entries of a contract are correct and complete, and
after verification by the contracting officer, the final
awarded contract will be produced with an electronically
transmitted signature. [Ref. 25 :p. 39]
APADE will also provide the following buyer
support: [Ref. 26]
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- Automated Bidders Mailing List
- Recommended consolidation of requisitions with existing
in-process requirements
- Terms, conditions, certifications, etc., for inclusion
in solicitations, amendments, awards, and modification
documents
- Automatic generation of delivery orders.
Training for the APADE system is being accomplished
by the Navy APADE Training Team (NATT) . Users are given
functional hands-on training in the actual working
environment. "Hands-on interface with the terminal allows
the students to perform the same functions in the training
environment as with the on-line system using a 'Training
Data Base 1 ." [Ref. 25:p. 39] Training is also provided
"on-site" if possible.
G. SUMMARY
This chapter addressed the background and implementation
of Pierside Procurement, various methods of small
purchasing, shipboard procedures prior to Pierside
Procurement, and finally present procedures for submission
of a requisition to Pierside Procurement sites. The present
procedures are by no means all encompassing, but were
selected as being most representative. The next chapter





There are eleven Pierside Procurement locations
throughout the continental United States and overseas. They
are as diverse as NSC Norfolk, which operates four pierside
sites in close proximity to its 127 ships and is installing
APADE, to NSC San Diego Long Beach Detachment, which has one
office, supports 22 ships and has no automation. Though
numerous problems have arisen with regard to this
initiative, we must not lose sight of the fact that Pierside
Procurement was implemented to alleviate shipboard
procurement problems and keep horror stories off the front
page of the newspaper. Problems encountered are as varied
as communication problems among various TYCOMs, Naval Supply
Centers, and customers to the cancellation of requisitions
by pierside offices. Primarily, we will look at problems
encountered at the Naval Supply Centers in Norfolk, San
Diego, Charleston, and Oakland and the Naval Supply Center
San Diego Long Beach Detachment. The two TYCOMs that will
be mentioned most frequently are COMNAVSURFLANT and
COMANVSURFPAC as they have encountered the most problems due
to the large number of assigned ships.
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2. TYCOM Guidance/Views
TYCOMs vary as to the guidance given to their ships
as far as requiring use of Pierside Procurement offices.
COMNAVSURFLANT is by far the most stringent. They require
their ships to use Pierside Procurement for all open
purchases with the exception of buying repair parts that
cost less than $500. The only other time a ship can
contract for parts/services on the open market is if the
ship is deploying the next day and it is after working hours
or if the ship is in a port with no Pierside Procurement
office. COMNAVSURFLANT is adamant regarding use of Pierside
Procurement offices and in several instances has pulled all
purchasing authority from ships that have violated
procurement regulations.
COMNAVSURFPAC , though not as rigid as COMNAVSURF-
LANT, has an aggressive approach to Pierside Procurement.
The program is closely monitored and numerous messages have
been sent to the fleet emphasizing the importance of
Pierside Procurement. Primary guidance given by COMNAVSURF-
PAC has been that "... contracting at the shipboard level
is authorized for emergency, high priority situations only.
My goal is to reduce shipboard procurement to as close as
zero as possible." [Ref. 27] COMNAVSURFPAC actively
solicits feedback from their ships and recently required
them to complete a survey assessing the Pierside Procurement
program.
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COMNAVAIRLANT, COMANVAIRPAC, and COMSUBLANT, look at
their ships use of Pierside Procurement in varying ways. It
should be noted that the ships of all three of these TYCOMs
have Commanders as Supply Officers and thus, as one TYCOM
representative said, "... are senior enough and possess
the experience so that we [the TYCOM] do not have to
constantly monitor them." This is interesting in view of
the fact that the USS Kitty Hawk problem was the primary
impetus for Pierside Procurement. Additional guidance and
views from these TYCOMs include:
COMNAVAIRLANT fully supports reduction of afloat
procurement and the establishment of pierside contracting
support. . . . These pierside purchasing facilities
should be used to the maximum extent possible. [Ref. 28]
Basically you can not open purchase unless it is an
emergency situation. Thus, it is practically mandatory
for our ships to use Pierside Procurement. [Ref. 29]
In summary, all TYCOMs are committed to Pierside
Procurement. TYCOMs monitor the ships closely through
statistical reports such as semi-annual purchasing
statistics and during Supply Management Inspections (SMIs)
.
The TYCOMs have a major stake in the success of the program
and as such mandate their ships utilize Pierside Procurement
unless they have an emergency requirement or when shore
support is unavailable.
B. PIERSIDE PROBLEMS
The advent of Pierside Procurement brought with it a
myriad of problems at various levels in the procurement
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process. These problems ran the gamut from lack of
resources to inadequate description of the requirement on
requisitions. Solutions to most problems have either been
implemented or are in the process of being implemented.
However, several problems will require additional research
and additional resources.
1. Lack of Adequate Funding
Funding has been an extremely troublesome area.
Initially, each Pierside Procurement site was to be
eventually funded with money for additional ceiling points.
(See Appendix A) The majority of these ceiling points were
to be authorized during Phases III and IV of the
implementation plan. To meet the 15 October 1985 start date
for Phase I, all activities had to provide clerks, technical
personnel, and buyers from their own assets. Additionally,
offices, furniture, and equipment had to be acquired with
internal assets. Said one Procurement Director, "It was a
zoo! We had no people, no space, and no equipment and yet
we had to be on-line in two weeks. We had to go to salvage
looking for desks, chairs, and office equipment." Several
interim funding messages were issued by NAVSUP, with a 14
March 1986 message authorizing the final ceiling
points/funds as follows: [Ref. 30]
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These figures represent end strengths initially envisioned
for Phase III. However, Phase IV was never implemented due
to a NAVSUP decision to implement Productive Unit Resourcing
(PUR) on 1 October 1986. This decision significantly-
changed the resourcing picture.
PUR is a complex system in which an activity
receives a pre-negotiated dollar amount for each purchase
action that is processed. (For example, NSC Norfolk
receives $34.04 for each small purchase action it
completes.
)
Under the productive unit resourcing system, NAVSUP
commits to fund work-load at the required level of
performance, i.e., field activities will be funded on the
basis of actual work performed vice the fixed
workyear/cost methodology used previously. . . . Thus by
paying its activities for work done on a productive unit
basis NAVSUP expects to achieve substantial gains in
workforce productivity and economy of operations through
the use of a more flexible workforce performance based on
incentive systems, specifically defined performance goals,
and management of overhead type costs. [Ref. 31 :p. 1]
The rates are negotiated with NAVSUP Headquarters.
Productive unit rates will be determined as a result of an
interactive negotiation process between NAVSUP
Headquarters and those field activities managed under the
system. [Ref. 31:p. 2]
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The field activities will then be required to file a
business plan with NAVSUP Headquarters.
. . . activities will develop productive unit rates based
on the actual rates being experienced. Adjustments may be
made for changes such as pay raises, nonlabor cost growth,
gains in efficiency, functional transfers, and anticipated
gains in productivity. These projections of productive
unit rates, coupled with workload projections plus
estimated overhead costs, will be submitted to NAVSUP
Headquarters as the activities fiscal year business plan.
[Ref. 31:p. 3]
Thus a combination of factors determine the
productive unit rate. This rate is used to determine an
activity's "profit" or "loss." If a "profit" is made, one
can fund additional ceiling points, buy equipment, or use
the money as seen fit. If one incurs a "loss," cutbacks may
be required. Obviously, this initiative is greatly
affecting the original funding levels anticipated for
Pierside Procurement.
Actual determination of purchase productive units
are beyond the scope of this paper. Note, however, that it
is a complicated process that has caused concern about the
resourcing process. One Purchase Director said, in regard
to his Pierside Procurement operation, "NAVSUP reneged on
their promise [for funding]. Now I have been forced to take
ceiling points and expend dollars out of hide." Said
another Small Purchase Director, "I didn't get a single
additional ceiling point for Pierside Procurement. I have
taken everything out of my own assets."
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Thus the funding of pierside sites raises an issue
to be addressed. At least three of the activities this
researcher visited or held discussions with indicated that
they have had to take money from other areas to fund
pierside operations. Several activities feel the PUR system
does not adequately compensate them for work done. For
example, one Purchase Director pointed out that if a
requisition is cancelled due to a lack of funds, the
material no longer being required, or a lack of adequate
technical data, the activity will not receive any credit
even though it may have expended numerous manhours on the
buy.
PUR is a new initiative and only time will tell if
it is successful. It should be noted that if an activity
makes a "profit," it is "profit" for the entire activity and
may not necessarily go to Pierside Procurement. In fact one
Purchase Director said Pierside Procurement is ". . . the
last place it would go."
2 . Lack of Communication Among TYCOMs . NSCs. and Ships
Communication 1: an act or instance of transmitting
2 a: information communicated b: a verbal or written
message 3a: a process by which information is exchanged
between individuals through a common system. ... b:
personal rapport. ... 5a: a technique for expressinq
ideas effectively. [Ref. 32:p. 225]
Communication is a vehicle by which the various
TYCOMs, pierside offices and customers can head off
potential problems, correct present problems, and exchanqe
ideas. Thouqh the opportunity for communication exists in
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the form of NSC-sponsored pierside conferences and other
forums such as Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group Eight's
"SUPPLY STRAIGHT TALK," several situations indicate that the
flow of information is being restricted:
1) Ships are generally not aware of the availability of
hard-copies of status. This problem is prevalent at
one particular pierside site but the problem was
evident at all sites.
2) Some ships were not aware of the extended hours of
operation at the pierside sites. This could account
for the "lack" of business afterhours and Saturdays.
3) Several ships visited were unaware of the nearest
Pierside Procurement office. (Two of these ships had
returned from deployment in the past month.)
4) Observations and interviews indicated that ships were
unaware of what services Pierside Procurement offices
provided.
This lack of communication serves as an impediment to a
smooth-running, cohesive and integrated operation. Thus,
the customer is not receiving the best service possible.
The potential exists for wasted manhours, a degradation of
readiness and perhaps another horror story.
3 . Customer Base Includes Shore Activities
".
. .to assist forces afloat ... a decision has
been made to transfer the bulk of afloat purchasing ashore."
[Ref. 16] Pierside offices were established to support
ships not shore activities. At three of the sites visited,
Pierside Procurement offices were buying for shore-based
activities. With backlogs and the pressure for buyers to
produce quality and expeditious buys, it appears that
processing requisitions for shore-based activities and
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staffs greatly detracts from purchasing effectiveness of
these activities and adds unnecessary time to PALT for
shipboard actions.
4 . Lack of Training for Acquisition Personnel
Training, or lack thereof, has been a problem in the
acquisition force for years. This is particularly true in
the Pierside Procurement environment where many of the
buyers are new and in training. Most of the buyers have
attended the Defense Small Purchase course but few have
attended the recently implemented 2 1/2 day Afloat
Purchasing Course.
Training is also required for our sailors who submit
requisitions to pierside or who must make the open purchase
buys when Pierside Procurement offices are inaccessible.
(NAVSUP was directed by CNO to develop and teach an afloat
small purchase course consistent with the anticipated
reduced level of afloat purchasing.) The 2 1/2 day Afloat
Purchasing course, presently being offered at Naval Supply
Centers, is the first step toward rectifying that problem.
Supply Officer training in the area of procurement
has also been woefully inadequate. In the past, Supply
Officers at Navy Supply Corps School (NSCS) , Athens received
the bare essentials in their basic training. When they
returned for the Supply Officer Refresher Training (SORT)
course, only one day in four weeks was spent on procurement.
This has changed. Recently, the first SORT course graduated
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after having been taught the 2 1/2 day Afloat Procurement
Course as part of their training. Additionally, the Basic
Qualification Course (BQC) has been expanded to include all
aspects of procurement—including Pierside Procurement.
This additional training at the fleet and field buying
levels should help to alleviate the inconsistencies,
confusion, and fear that presently exist in buying
methodologies
.
5 . Pierside Offices Not Physically Located Near Ships
It was the intent of the Pierside Procurement
initiative to locate the Pierside Procurement offices near
the customers. Of the five sites visited, only NSC Norfolk
and NSC Charleston have met this reguirement. However, in
many cases, it would not be cost-effective to locate
pierside sites within walking distance of every ship. For
example, NSC Oakland would have to put additional sites at
Concord, Mare Island, Treasure Island, and Hunter's Point in
addition to their site at NAS Alameda. The volume of
business, ten to fifteen ships, does not seem to justify
this endeavor. NSC San Diego, on the other hand, supports
up to 80 ships at its 32nd Street location and at best, the
Pierside Procurement site is convenient to 30% of those
ships. Though NSC San Diego is expanding, it should look at
moving closer to the ships.
Pierside Procurement offices which are located
excessive distances from the ship, offer a convenient
"excuse" for a ship not availing itself of their services.
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6 . Lack of Technical Screening Function/Technical
Screening Function Separated from the Pierside
Office
Another problem is the location of the technical
screening function. Several Pierside Procurement offices
have no technical screening or the technical section is far-
removed from the pierside site. This greatly hampers the
intent of Pierside Procurement and degrades the entire
process. The technical screening function is intended to
determine if the open purchase requisitions can be crossed
to standard stock items. Additionally, it assists the
buyers by providing technical information that facilitates
buying the required material. Without this function, the
potential exists for the Government to buy items which are
available with standard stock or to buy the incorrect
material. Both cases result in additional expense to the
Government.
The location of the technical screening function is
of paramount importance. NSC Norfolk's technical section is
located in a building separate from the pierside office.
This precludes important information exchanges between the
customer and the technical section. This researcher
observed technical personnel at NSC Charleston and NSC San
Diego actively involved in dialogue with customers in
attempting to correctly identify a requirement. Without
this interface, the potential exists for the requisition to
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be rejected, cancelled, or the wrong material to be
purchased.
7 . Underutilization of Pierside Offices After Hours
and on Weekends
Several ships cited hours at Pierside Procurement
offices as being inadequate. In the interim, both NSC
Norfolk and NSC San Diego have greatly increased hours. NSC
San Diego is open from 0700-1800 Monday through Friday and
from 0800-1630 on Saturday. NSC Norfolk is open from 0700-
1800 Monday through Friday and 0730-1600 on Saturday. The
problem lies in the fact that the Pierside Procurement
offices are vastly underutilized on Saturdays. A buyer from
one of the sites said, "I have averaged two-three customers
on Saturday for the past month." Though several ships cited
the lack of accessibility of Pierside Procurement offices on
Saturday, the cost-effectiveness of being open should be re-
evaluated.
Additionally, in a survey of thirty government
contractors in the areas of Norfolk, San Diego, and
Charleston, only twelve were found to be open on Saturday
and of those twelve, seven were only open for half a day.
Even if customers availed themselves of the Saturday hours,
it is doubtful if the customer's needs could be met. It
should be noted however, that of the thirty contractors




Lack of an Imprest Fund at Pierside Offices
Another problem at the Pierside Procurement sites is
the lack of a pierside imprest fund. Most ships are
discouraged from having an imprest fund and often utilize
the imprest fund at the NSC or NRCC. The imprest fund is
one of the preferred methods of procurement and greatly
expedites an open purchase buy. Most NSCs and NRCCs make
their imprest funds available but the locations are usually
far-removed from the pierside locations. Again, lack of
funds was a common response as to why an imprest fund was
not located at pierside.
9 Inadequate Technical Information Provided by
Shipboard Personnel
From the Pierside Procurement office point of view,
the biggest problem is the lack of adequate technical
information on a 1250-1, 1149, or 1348-6. Of the ten office
supervisors queried, nine said inadequate technical
information was the major problem from their perspective.
Inadequate descriptive data requires the Pierside
Procurement office to go back to the ship for additional
information via telephone, message, or memo (See Appendices
F and G) . Buyers are sensitive to the fact that without
adequate information the ship may get the wrong material.
One supervisor related how a ship requested $10,000 worth of
mess decks chairs. Upon receipt, it was discovered that the
wrong chairs had been ordered and the ship had to make "do"
or be out $10,000. Though this is the exception, it does
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happen. Also, while buyers await additional information,
PALT continues hence, further distorting this statistical
measurement. Most supervisors agree the ships are providing
better technical information, but much greater improvement
is necessary.
As a means to alleviate the problem, several
pierside offices have sent supervisors and/or buyers aboard
ships to conduct training with the Petty Officers
responsible for filling out pierside requirements. The
larger ships have found this to be helpful and highly
desirable and pierside sites immediately noted a quantum
improvement in technical descriptions.
NAVSUP has promulgated instructions for what they
consider to be required information for local purchase of
nonstandard items (See Appendix H) . In addition to this
guidance, NSCs have sent various messages outlining the
required information.
Many ships are frustrated because Pierside
Procurement offices seem to require technical information
not previously required for a similar buy. This "problem"
will continue until buyers gain the required experienced to
make efficient, competitive buys. This is a "problem" that
comes with the implementation of a new system. If the
buyers did not require in-depth descriptive data, the ships
might be getting the wrong material. Research indicates
receipt of the wrong material has not been a major problem.
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10 . An Inordinate Number of Bearer Walk-Thrus Sent to
Pierside Procurement
When a ship requires material immediately, it
initiates a bearer walk-thru. After the requisition is
processed on the ship, a Petty Officer from the end-user
division will usually take the requisition to the Pierside
Procurement office, wait for processing and pick up the
material from the contractor. This process could take up to
six or seven hours or longer.
All Pierside Procurement offices process a bearer
walk-thru immediately. A bearer walk-thru is generally
required to be priority 06 or above. Thus, if one ship
submitted a bearer requisition with a priority of 13 and
another ship submitted a non-bearer requisition with
priority 06, the bearer walk-thru would take precedence.
A brief description of the Navy's priority system is
required before the problem is addressed. A priority
designator (PD) is determined from a combination of the
force activity designator (F/AD) and the applicable urgency
of need designator (UND) . A F/AD is "... a unit,
organization, or installation performing a mission or
function; a body of troops, ships, or aircraft, or
combination thereof; or a function, mission, project or
program." [Ref. 23:3045] F/AD is a Roman numeral (I-V)
which categorizes a force or activity on the basis of







. . . assigned to U.S. forces in combat and
other United States or foreign country forces or
activities designated by the Secretary of
Defense as recommended by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (JCS)
.
U.S. combat, combat ready, and direct combat
support forces deployed to or operating outside
the 50 states and adjacent waters, Panama, the
Caribbean area, and such other areas as may be
designated by the JCS.
All other U.S. combat ready and direct support
forces outside CONUS not included under F/AD II.
CONUS forces maintained in a state of readiness
for deployment to combat prior to D + 30.
U.S. forces being maintained in a state of
combat readiness for deployment to combat during
the period D + 30 to D + 90.
All other
23:3046]
U.S. forces or activities. [Ref
.
Essentially, the majority of ships in CONUS ports where
pierside sites are located come under F/AD III.
UNDs are broken down as follows:
UND
B
(1) Requirement is immediate
(2) Without the material needed, the activity is
unable to perform one of its primary missions
(1) Requirement is immediate, or it is known that such
requirement will occur in the immediate future
(2) The activity's ability to perform one or more of
its primary missions will be impaired until the
material is received
C (1) Requirement is routine. [Ref. 23:3047]
The following chart is applicable:
65
IUND: A B C
FAD 01 04 11
II 02 05 12
III 03 06 13
IV 07 09 14
V 08 10 15
The majority of requisitions submitted to pierside
offices are PD 06 or above. Guidance from NAVSUP P-485
states, that with the exception of submarine tenders,
destroyer tenders, repair ships, and aircraft carriers, only
55% of all requisitions submitted should be PD 01-08.
The problem arises when an inordinately high number
of bearer walk-thrus are initiated. This researcher saw
requisitions for detergent, aprons, plastic forks and
spoons, and wax that were designated as priority 06—bearer
walk-thru. Not only is this an abuse of the priority
system, but it penalizes ships that try to abide by priority
designations. When 45% of the requisitions at one pierside
site are bearer walk-thrus (as was found to be the case)
,
the PALT for the other 55% of the requisitions is going to
suffer accordingly. The problem perpetuates itself when
ships that were properly assigning priority designators now
start to submit bearer walk-thrus. Said one Supply Officer,
"NSC is not responsive enough. Why shouldn't I submit
bearer walk-thrus? Everyone else does!" An Assistant
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Supply Officer said, "As long as NSC continues to accept
bearer walk-thrus, I'll submit them for anything."
Almost without exception, each Pierside Procurement
supervisor stated that it served no purpose to reject such
requisitions because they'd just come back with a
certification from the Commanding Officer or Supply Officer
"justifying" a bearer walk-thru. Standards for walk-thrus
are generally in place (See Appendix I) but are ignored by
customers.
NSC San Diego sent out the following message to
address the problem:
A recent surge of walk-thru requisitions has slowed
processing at the pierside sites. Non-essential
requisitions processed as walk-thrus delay the processing
of requisitions of all other customers . . . only IG-I
[issue group I] and IG-II work-stoppage open-purchase
requisitions are eligible for walk-thru procedures.
Adherence to established procedures will improve system
responsiveness for all customers. [Ref. 33]
11 . Cancellation of Requisitions
Several shipboard activities cited the cancellation
of requisitions as a major problem. Among the ships
queried, the researcher found this problem to be on a small
scale. Most pierside sites go "overboard" in an attempt to
get additional information from a ship before they cancel
requisitions. This is noteworthy in view of the fact that
PALT continues while the pierside sites attempt to gather
this information. Said one pierside supervisor,
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We want to buy what the ship requires. We are here to
support the ships and everything else is secondary. If we
have to wait ten days for a response, we will. We cancel
a requisition only after a conscientious effort is made to
get the additional information.
12 . Lack of Standardization in Buying Practices Among
Pierside Sites
Buyer methodology differs greatly among the various
Pierside Procurement sites. This can be attributed to
various degrees of training and experience, supervisory
control, and workload. All buys at pierside sites fall
under the "Small Purchase and Other Simplified Purchase
Procedures" of the Federal Acquisition Regulation and as
such should be administered accordingly. The areas of
primary interest to this researcher were the determination
of a "fair and reasonable" price, the amount of competition,
socio-economic issues, and the use of large businesses.
A particularly important issue is the buyer's
interpretation of a "fair and reasonable" price. FAR states
that "Purchases not exceeding this limit [$1,000] may be
made without securing competitive quotations if the
contracting officer considers the prices to be reasonable .
"
[Ref. 2:13.106] If the offer is not "fair and reasonable"
the Government is paying too much for an item. Upon
querying buyers concerning what they considered "fair and
reasonable," several diverse and interesting responses were
made. One buyer said, "If a ship submits a requisition for
less than $1,000 and lists a recommended source, I'll buy
it. The ship knows what is fair and reasonable better than
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I do." More surprising was the pierside office supervisor
who said, "If it is less than a thousand dollars and not
obviously overpriced, we'll buy it. A determination of
'reasonableness' is not usually made." On the other end of
the spectrum, was the buyer who said,
If I haven't already bought it before, I'll go to the
other buyers to see if they have. If they haven't, I'll
check various price lists for a common item. Failing
that, I'll get at least two competitive bids to determine
if the item is fairly priced.
It should be noted that the buyer who considered nearly
anything to be "fair and reasonable" worked in a pressure-
packed environment in which buyers were taxed to the extreme
and heavy backlogs were the rule.
The amount of competition solicited is also an
extremely interesting area of research. Pierside
Procurement offices operate in an environment of extreme
pressure to make expeditious and quality buys. (These terms
are usually not synonymous.) Thus, this researcher found it
of particular interest when it was discovered that one
pierside site was competing all buys under $1,000. This
practice was stopped after a recent NAVSUP Inspector General
[IG] inspection, but it greatly added to the backlog of this
pierside site. As one NAVSUP official said, "They were
being overly-cautious." This seems impossible in today's
age of the $4 3 5 hammer and the USS Kitty Hawk debacle, but
it was true. Perhaps Colleen A. Preston, in a CSIS
Acquisition Study, was right when she said:
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. . . [There exists] in the Department of Defense an
environment in which few will take risks or exercise
judgment for fear of being the next person to be hung at
the mast for paying too much for a stool cap. [Ref. 34 :p.
2]
While some offices are attempting to make the "fair
and reasonable" determination for purchases under $1,000 and
most are attempting to solicit three responses for purchases
over $1,000, many offices do not attempt to establish
"reasonableness" for purchases over $1,000 in which two of
the responses are "no bids." One buyer said, "My duty is to
attempt to get competition. If I solicit three bids and two
submit 'no bids,' I have done my job."
Also many sites differ as to their outlook on socio-
economic programs. One supervisor said, "All my buyers care
about is buying from a small business. If that small
business happens to be woman-owned or minority-owned all the
better, but we don't have the time to search out minority or
woman-owned businesses." Another supervisor said, ". . .
minority and woman-owned businesses are important and
actively sought; however, we don't always do a good job."
Another problem area is the determination of when
large business should be used in purchases of less than
$10,000—an area automatically reserved for small business
set-asides. To reiterate, small businesses should always be
used unless: [Ref. 20:13.105]
(1) . . . the contracting officer determines there is no
reasonable chance of obtaining quotations from two (2) or
more responsible small business concerns that will be
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competitive in terms of market price, quality, and
delivery.
(2) . . . you don't receive a quotation from a small
business concern at a reasonable price, or a quotation
which meets your required delivery date and/or purchase
description/specification, then you may dissolve the small
business—small purchase set-aside. . . .
This researcher found, almost without exception, buyers
would not award to large businesses even when the disparity
between prices was 50%-75%. The only time they would award
to large business was when they were a sole source. This is
a problem because the Government is paying highly
questionable prices when the FAR specifically states that a
small business—small purchase set-aside can be dissolved
and award made to a large business when "... the
contracting officer does not receive a reasonable quotation
from a responsible small-business concern." [Ref. 2:13.105]
Though several of the buyers said they would award to large
businesses if a great disparity existed, they were in the
great minority.
13 . Problems in the Measurement and Concept of PALT
PALT is one of the primary statistical gauges of the
Pierside Procurement process. "... PALT at pierside
purchasing sites is ... to begin with initial document
receipt at the pierside office and average a maximum of five
days." [Ref. 35] The researcher asked Purchase Directors
and/or supervisors from each Naval Supply Center or Naval
Regional Contracting Center visited if PALT was a good
evaluation of the system. One supervisor's observation
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summed up the group's consensus, "No—but it is the best
measure we have."
The most difficult aspect of PALT is with its
measurement. Of the NSCs visited, only one computed PALT in
accordance with NAVSUP's guidance. The findings are
interesting and included such deviations as:
- Several activities have no technical screening function.
- One activity does not measure technical time because of
a lack of manpower to actually compute PALT manually.
- Several sites do not start PALT until the requisition is
actually being processed. In other words, a requisition
can sit several days in an input clerk's basket or
customer service representative's basket and PALT would
not start until it was "touched." In some instances
this may take several days.
- Several activities stop PALT when they cannot reach or
contact a ship for additional information or clarifica-
tion of a requirement.
- NSC Charleston randomly samples one hundred requisitions
per month and comparing the date the requisition is
logged-in to the date the requisition is entered into
the computer (after technical screening) , this becomes
the "average" technical time to be added to each
requisition.
As one pierside supervisor stated, "PALT can easily be
manipulated to fall within the five day parameter."
Not surprisingly, measurement of PALT has come under
the scrutiny of several TYCOMs. COMNAVSURFPAC noted:
They are changing document input again to start the clock
moving from the time the ship drops off the document at
the pierside office. . . . Currently documents are
dropped off at customer service and 3-4 days expire from
entry into customer service to delivery to the purchase
section. [Ref. 36]
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The above refers to the fact that NSC San Diego was starting
to measure PALT in accordance with NAVSUP guidance.
The aforementioned problems with PALT significantly
reduce its usefulness as an effective measurement of
efficiency and/or timeliness. Conceptually, the measurement
of PALT is also "flawed" in several ways. The most common
complaint heard by the researcher was that PALT continued
even on weekends. For example, if a requisition was brought
to a Pierside Procurement office on Friday at 1530, in all
probability it would not be acted upon until Monday. Thus,
PALT is already at three days and nothing has been done with
the requisition. Additionally, if a requisition is dropped
off before a deployment or local operations and a question
arises, it usually takes several days for more) to contact a
ship via message for clarification. Most Pierside
Procurement sites give the ship a due date to respond to the
message or the requisition will be cancelled. However, the
lapse in time between the message and the response counts
against the Pierside Procurement offices' PALT.
The inaccurate assessment of PALT is giving
Headquarters Commands, TYCOMs, and customers a distorted
view of the pierside program. A goal of five day PALT is
set and most observers assess the success of Pierside
Procurement using this gauge. However, it is obvious that
in the majority of cases, PALT is much higher and a true
assessment of Pierside Procurement cannot be made using the
73
present, and diverse forms of PALT measurement. Thus,
readiness can be adversely affected if we continue to gauge
Pierside Procurement as a success based on the present
methods of PALT assessment.
14 . Excessive PALT
Though they realize the implications of Pierside
Procurement, several ships are disillusioned by the
"excessive" time it takes to receive material. It must be
noted that on Pierside Procurement's "best day" it will
take, on average four or five more days, to get material
then a shipboard procurement. Most ships accept this
"trade-off" to get the purchasing function off the ship.
This is particularly true of the smaller ships. The larger
ships, with Commanders as Supply Officers, are not as guick
to accept this "trade-off" due to their previous experience
levels and the new reduction of their authority.
PALT can also be measured against the standard of
five days as promulgated by NAVSUP. Of the ten reporting
activities (NSC San Diego Long Beach Detachment is included
with NSC San Diego) , NSC Puget Sound, NSC Pearl Harbor, NSC
Norfolk, NSC Jacksonville, and NRCC Naples have exceeded the
five day standard on two or more occasions in the October
1986-March 1987 time frame. NSC Pensacola, NSC Charleston,
NSC San Diego, NSC Oakland, and NRCC Philadelphia have not
exceeded the PALT standard in the same timeframe. (PALT
will be further assessed in Chapter IV.) It should be noted
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that the measurement of PALT was calculated differently at
the five sites visited by this researcher, and as such is
expected to vary among the ten sites.
Excessive PALT can be attributed to any number of
the problems discussed in this chapter. For example, lack
of funds can affect PALT by reducing the number of available
buyers and technicians, or not providing state-of-the-art
equipment for data processing and status. Inadequate
technical data furnished by the customer requires the
pierside office to ask the ship for additional data—thus
extending PALT. APADE implementation takes buyers away from
a Pierside Procurement office for a substantial period of
time and contributes to excessive PALT.
Excessive PALT greatly affects readiness, as it
delays or impairs the readiness of a ship. The longer the
PALT, the worse the situation becomes. If PALT at pierside
sites becomes too excessive, ships will attempt to
circumvent the system and open themselves to potential
procurement irregularities.
15. Failure to Receive a Hard-Copy of the Purchase
Action Aboard Ship Before Material Receipt
A hard-copy of the purchase action is not being
received by the ship until after delivery of the material.
A COMNAVSURFPAC survey indicated that receipt of the hard-
copy of the purchase action by the ship ranged anywhere from
an average of seven days to seventy days. This poses
problems inasmuch as a ship does not know the terms of the
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purchase action and thus must either accept the material on
a dummy invoice or reject the material. If the material is
rejected, readiness is affected.
The researcher found this problem to exist in
approximately 90% of the ships queried. A copy of the
purchase action can be readily obtained by calling the
cognizant Pierside Procurement office but it is after the
fact and thus too late. The main problem is with
preparation of the purchase action and distribution.
Pierside sites vary in this procedure and at one major
pierside site, the lead-buyer described the process after
award as follows:
The bid sheet is sent to the pierside input clerk
who updates the information in the computer and makes copies
for distribution. Delivery orders and BPAs are sent to the
Naval Supply Center (located several miles away) to be
entered into their computer and filed. The Supply Center
types the DD 1155 for Purchase Orders and returns it to the
Pierside Procurement office for signature by the contracting
officer and distribution to the ship. This process often
takes five or six weeks.
Obviously, this process makes it difficult for the
ship to receive a hard-copy of the purchase action before
receipt of the material. This is particularly true if the
purchase is made via a BPA since the material often arrives




16 . Failure to Provide Status to Ships
In a survey done by COMANVSURFPAC and in interviews
conducted by the researcher, several customers cited lack of
timely status as a major problem. One ship responded,
"Availability of status is a problem of major concern. [It
is] extremely difficult to obtain status of open purchase
requisitions." [Ref. 37] The lack of status makes it
impossible for a ship to discern where a requisition is and
as such, could impede readiness by delaying receipt of an
essential part. However, the researcher found the problem
not to be the lack of the status, but rather how it is
obtained.
Initially, activities had problems with providing
status because of "growing pains." Some Pierside
Procurement offices were not automated, due to a lack of
funds, until nine or ten months after pierside operations
were implemented. (NSC San Diego Long Beach Detachment, NSC
Oakland [NAS Alameda], and NRCC Philadelphia still are not
automated.) The present problem lies in how status is
disseminated. Most activities only give status if they are
asked for it by the customer. However, a hard-copy of
status will be provided by most automated Pierside
Procurement offices upon request. Additionally, all
activities are most responsive to requests for status by
phone call. Many of the ships were aware of the
availability of status by phone call but did not realize
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that a hard-copy of all their outstanding requisitions was
available upon request. Thus, the frustration of receiving
status only on three to five requisitions at a time over the
phone can be easily overcome.
17 . Implementation of APADE
Although APADE has only been implemented on a
limited basis, the problems that have occurred are
anticipated to occur at other sites as the implementation
process proceeds. Heretofore, problems with APADE have
evolved during the implementation process at NSC Puget
Sound. Training and the subsequent learning process can
leave a tremendous "gap" in productivity—even with the
four-phase implementation process. Productivity can
decrease by as much as 87% activity-wide depending on the
stage of implementation and it took NSC Puget Sound three
months to return to 100% productivity. Just when
productivity levels get to 100%, training on another phase
starts up. (See Appendices J and K)
The loss of productivity in the Pierside Procurement
area could be alleviated by replacing pierside personnel
being sent to APADE training with experienced APADE users.
These "experienced" users would come from larger divisions
better able to handle a loss of four to six people. This
could be accomplished by initially sending personnel from
the chosen division (s) to APADE training and then allowing
them to return to their "parent" divisions for two-three
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months of on-the-job training. They would then be rotated
into Pierside Procurement as personnel were sent to APADE
training. Thus, an area as important as Pierside
Procurement would not suffer the ever-present "growing
pains.
"
Another management problem that surfaced at NSC
Puget Sound was totally unexpected. A personnel problem
arose due to the fact that junior personnel adapted more
guickly to the APADE system because of more "hands on"
training. Additionally, because senior personnel only enter
the system at a management review level they became
intimidated by the new system. Thus, a precarious situation
existed between junior and senior personnel.
APADE is a new endeavor and as such the full impact
of the problem cannot be assessed at this time. As more
sites receive APADE the problem can be better addressed.
Regardless, it appears that APADE will definitely impact on
the Pierside Procurement process.
C. SUMMARY
This chapter addressed a myriad of problems at the
TYCOM, Naval Supply Center, and customer levels. These are
the major problems as perceived by the researcher. Thus,
not every "problem" disclosed to this researcher was
included. The next chapter is an assessment of the Pierside
Procurement initiative.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF PIERS IDE PROCUREMENT
A. INTRODUCTION
The Pierside Procurement initiative has met with "mixed
reviews" in its eighteen months of existence. TYCOMs, Naval
Supply Centers, and customers have expounded on the virtues
of a centralized procurement organization but are divided as
to how to accomplish the monumental task of potentially
processing more than 410,000 shipboard open purchase
requisitions each year at pierside sites. This task is made
more difficult by the non-standard set of rules, procedures,
and regulations at the various Naval Supply Centers and
Naval Regional Contracting Centers with pierside sites.
However, all "players" in the Pierside Procurement
initiative are convinced this method is the answer to
shipboard procurement problems and are dedicated to making
it work.
A memorandum from the Commander of the Naval Supply
Systems Command (RADM E. K. Walker, Jr.) to the Vice Chief
of Naval Operations stated:
Informal feedback received from the Fleet combined with
statistics reported by Contracting Officers and fleet
units indicate that the pierside purchasing initiative has
been extremely successful. During FY 86, Pierside
Purchasing Offices processed approximately 173,000
shipboard requisitions (64,000 purchase actions) valued at
$62.4 million. . . . Additionally during the last six
months of FY 86 (after pierside purchasing offices were
fully operational) pierside purchasing offices handled
over 89% of the Fleet's CONUS small purchase dollar volume
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and 77% of its CONUS small purchase actions.
Pierside Procurement Offices are now processing the bulk
of Fleet purchase requirements (which was our original
objective in implementing Pierside) and are doing an
outstanding job in providing the Fleet with responsive
contracting support. [Ref. 38]
Figure 4.1, reproduced from Admiral Walker's memorandum,
graphically displays the progress of the program in
transferring the bulk of Fleet purchase requirements to
pierside sites.
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Figure 4.1 Fleet CONUS Purchase Actions, FY 86
In light of the objective that Pierside Purchasing
offices process the bulk of fleet purchase requirements, the
initiative has been successful. Additionally, procurement
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irregularities have not made "front page" news for quite
some time. The problem lies in the actual operation of the
pierside offices. A letter from Vice Admiral G. W. Davis,
Jr., Commander, Naval Surface Force U.S. Pacific Fleet to
Admiral Walker, stated:
. . . . For the most part, afloat response to pierside
procurement was positive. . . . [However] under the best
conditions, pierside procurement has not been able to
compete with shipboard procurement capabilities in terms
of responsiveness to emergency requirements. Short-fused
and high-priority requirements generated by tender
availabilities of short duration pose a significant
challenge. . . . For a one month period, 262 open
purchase documents from Acadia were hand carried to
pierside customer service at NSC San Diego. Of this
total, 104 documents were not acknowledged as received by
the NSC at the end of 3 days. For the remainder, the
average length of time from document submittal to NSC
acknowledgement was 6 days, with 51 documents delayed more
than 12 days. Of the 158 documents acknowledged with a
start date, 8 had not been awarded at the end of 3
days. . . . [Acadia's Commanding Officer's] communication
with me was an earnest effort to identify and resolve
problems, and he is aware that improvements may need to be
made in Acadia as well as by NSC San Diego.
Parenthetically, it is worthwhile to note that Acadia
spent six weeks tending ships in the San Francisco area
. . . and . . .they received superlative support from
pierside purchasing at Alameda. [Ref. 39]
Thus, it can be seen that Pierside Procurement has the
attention of high-ranking officials and has elicited a
variety of responses. The success or failure of a program
cannot be gauged by one letter or even one year of
statistical data; however, it is readily apparent that
Pierside Procurement has a variety of interest groups that




A major statistical measure of the Pierside
Procurement initiative is PALT. PALT as an indicator gives
the elapsed time from receipt of a ready requirement at a
pierside office to the award by the buyer. PALT includes
entry into the system, technical screening, and award.
Conceptually, this would be a good comparison of the
efficiency of various Pierside Procurement offices if PALT
was uniformly calculated in the manner directed by NAVSUP.
However, each site calculates PALT differently, thus
distorting PALT as a comparative measure. Nevertheless, it
does serve as an indicator regarding how a particular NSC or
NRCC is "progressing."
PALT is broken into two distinct timeframes. Prior
to 1 October 1986, PALT, which did not include technical
screening, was based on a goal of three days. After 1
October 1986, a goal of five days was established, which
included technical screening. Tables 4.1 and 4.2 indicate
PALT for all Pierside Procurement sites for FY 86 and FY 87.
As the tables indicate, prior to 1 October 1986, the
pierside sites achieved their goal of a three day PALT 39%
of the time. After 1 October 1986, that figure rose to 72%.
Regardless of the validity of the five day goal, this
indicates several things. Though NAVSUP added two days for




FY 8 6 PROCUREMENT ADMINISTRATIVE LEAD TIME (GOAL 3 DAYS)
FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEPT
NSC Oakland 5.3 5.7 5.8 5.8 4.6 4.0 4.0 3.8
NSC Pearl Harbor 2.0 2.4 2.4 2.0 2.0 2.0 7.6 9.2
NSC Puget Sound 8.0 8.0 8.0 7.0 6.0 5.0 8.0 8.0
NSC San Diego 6.0 4.9 4.3 3.0 4.0 3.0 3.1 3.0
NRCC Long Beach 2.0 2.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 5.0 5.0
NRCC Philadelphia 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.0 1.0 1.0
NSC Jacksonville 2.8 2.3 1.8 4.0 3.6 3.5 3.7 2.5
NSC Norfolk 3.0 3.6 3.5 4.0 5.0 6.0 5.0 4.0
NSC Charleston N/A 5.0 5.1 5.0 3.0 3.0 3.3 3.2
NRCC Naples N/A N/A N/A N/A 8.6 13.5 6.3 20.8
NSC Pensacola N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.0 1.2 1.7 1.4
Source: NAVSUP
at the pierside sites discovered that the actual screening
function by the technician was actually accomplished in
fifteen minutes or less for 80% of the requisitions.
Obviously, this depends on the backlog, adequacy of the
information on the requisition, and the difficulty involved.
As support for this observation, the researcher sampled 100
requisitions submitted to a pierside site and found the
average time from submission for technical screening until
the requisition was returned to the input clerk was two
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TABLE 4.2
FY 87 PROCUREMENT ADMINISTRATIVE LEAD TIME (GOAL 5 DAYS)
WEIGHTED












4.0 3.2 3.8 4.2 4.9 5.0 4.16
5.0 10.0 9.0 11.0 8.0 2.0 7.61
7.0 6.0 6.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.69
3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 3.0 4.0 3.57
(Now NSC SAN DIEGO, LONG BEACH
DETACHMENT. Data included with NSC San
Diego.
)
2.0 2.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.82
3.8 4.2 5.3 5.8 6.1 5.7 5.27
4.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 5.0 6.0 5.11
4.8 4.7 4.7 5.0 5.0 5.0 4.87
5.8 5.1 7.6 8.9 7.0 11.0 8.04
2.75 2.96 4.24 1.66 2.30 3.00 2.88
Source: NAVSUP
hours twelve minutes. Thus, the addition of two days for
the technical screening function may be excessive.
PALT can also be greatly affected by a number of the
following conditions: experience level, numbers of buyers
and technical personnel; quality of personnel; difficulty of
the buy; methods of measurement; and various other factors.
The monthly productive rate (completions divided by
manhours) is an indicator of the quality of personnel and
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the gains/losses made. Table 4.3 shows that the rate varies
from an average of .51 at NRCC Naples to 2.28 at NSC
Charleston for FY 87.
TABLE 4.3
FY 87 MONTHLY PRODUCTIVE RATE
OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR CUM
NSC Pensacola 2.07 2.63 2.11 1.76 1.76 1.82 2.01
NSC Charleston 2.18 2.06 2.66 2.22 2.55 2.09 2.28
NSC San Diego 1.32 2.08 2.00 2.11 2.67 2.21 2.05
NSC Puget Sound 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
NSC Oakland 1.64 1.32 2.15 1.62 2.16 2.07 1.76
NSC Pearl Harbor 1.58 1.79 1.94 2.82 2.06 1.97 2.04
NSC Norfolk 0.64 1.20 1.46 0.94 1.34 1.27 1.12
NSC Jacksonville 0.56 0.68 0.56 0.89 0.93 0.88 0.75
NRCC Philadelphia 1.01 1.33 1.46 1.90 1.92 1.63 1.55
NRCC Naples 0.53 0.32 0.15 0.42 0.56 1.09 0.51
Source: NAVSUP
This table provides insight into several interesting
observations. Most obvious is the wide fluctuation among
the activities. The monthly productive rate ranged from .15
to 2.82. This can be attributed to fluctuations in volume,
experience levels, learning curves, and difficulty of buys.
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Additionally, in all but two cases, the monthly
productive rate showed an increase during the period October
1986 to March 1987. One would surmise that PALT should
decrease during this time period; however, PALT has
increased or remained the same at eight of the ten
activities. With productive rates increasing and PALT also
increasing it would seem to indicate that Pierside
Procurement offices are experiencing problems in other
areas. During the October 1986 to March 1987 timeframe
while workload increased by 38%, the available manhours
increased by only 10%. Possibly, NSCs and NRCCs are not
staffing pierside offices with sufficient personnel to
handle the increased workload.
PALT could provide a legitimate assessment of the
Pierside Procurement program. However, until all NSCs and
NRCCs calculate PALT in a consistent manner, it will be
difficult to use as a comparison method. In many cases,
accurate assessment of PALT may require funding from NAVSUP
to facilitate the hiring of additional personnel.
2 . Comparisons of Receipts, Completions, and Backlogs
For FY 86 and FY 87, comparisons of receipts,
completions, and backlogs are invaluable as indicators of
the success of the Pierside Procurement initiative. Table
4.4 shows a dramatic increase in the number of requisitions
processed at pierside sites in the October 1986 to February
1987 timeframe as compared to the October 1985 to February
87
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1986 timeframe. The first five months of FY 87 saw a 61%
increase in the amount of requisitions submitted to Pierside
Procurement offices from FY 86 levels. At the same time
there was a 5.8% increase in the total completion rate.
This is indicative of the tremendous gains made in the
productive rate monthly. Additionally, the backlog for FY
87 has only increased by 2,538 as compared to the FY 86
February Year to Date (YTD) backlog of 4,524.
3 . Semiannual Purchase Statistics
The Semiannual Afloat Unit Purchase Statistics
Report is another key indicator of whether pierside
objectives are being accomplished. This semiannual report
(See Appendix L) indicates the number of open purchase
actions by Type Commander. The majority of the open
purchase actions (20,648 of 25,855 [80%] for the first half
of FY 86) were accomplished by COMNAVSURFPAC and
COMNAVSURFLANT ships and therefore this section will focus
on these two Type Commands.
COMNAVSURFPAC has 177 ships located in fourteen
ports throughout the continental United States and overseas.
Table 4.5 provides a comparative analysis of the last three
semiannual reports which reveals significant progress in the
area of reducing the amount of open purchases aboard SURFPAC
ships. The period 1 October 1985 to 31 March 1987 saw a 70%
decrease in the number of shipboard open purchase actions
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The average number of open purchase actions per ship was
reduced from 80 to 23. This is impressive in view of the
fact that six ships initiated 1,159 of 4,091 (28%) of the
open purchase actions.
SURFPAC has been proactive in attempting to reduce
the number of open purchases aboard their ships.
Messages were sent to all SURFPAC afloat commands who
reported 80 or more procurement actions on the previous
semiannual purchase statistics reports requesting they
. . . take corrective action as appropriate to reduce the
number of open market procurement actions to as close to
zero as possible. ... In addition, COMNAVSURFPAC is
reviewing monthly reports on open purchases contracted by
its ships and challenging those purchases that do not fall
into [COMNAVSURFPAC] guidelines. . . . Although
COMNAVSURFPAC has not removed procurement authority at the
shipboard level, use of this authority is restricted to
support mission essential, high-priority, short-fused
requirements. The use of ashore contracting facilities
has been strongly encouraged. . . . [Ref. 14]
SURFPAC also monitors their ships by reviewing all
bills paid by the Fleet Accounting and Disbursing Center,
U.S. Pacific Fleet (FAADCPAC) . If a purchase appears
"questionable," SURFPAC will request that all relevant
documents in the Purchase Order file be forwarded to SURFPAC
for review. Subsequent reviews have indicated that 95% of
these purchases were not mission-essential.
COMNAVSURFLANT , the largest of the six TYCOMs , has
approximately 195 ships located in twelve ports throughout
the continental United States and overseas. SURFLANT
actively monitors shipboard purchasing actions and has also
shown significant improvement in reducing the amount of open
purchase actions. COMNAVSURFLANT continues to be the most
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stringent TYCOM in its policy permitting ships to open
purchase material. They only permit open purchase of repair
parts costing less than $500 or any open purchase may be
made if it is after working hours and the ship is deploying
the next day. SURFLANT appears to be a strong advocate of
the Pierside Procurement initiative. Table 4.6 indicates a
68.2% decrease in the number of open purchase actions from 1
October 1985 to 31 March 1987 and a 62% decrease in dollar
value during the same time period.
Open purchases will never be reduced to zero.
Pierside Procurement offices are not located in every port
and there will always be a few instances of a valid
emergency requirement; however, the Semiannual Purchase
Report indicates significant reductions in the amount of
open purchase actions aboard ships. TYCOMs have let their
ships know that each open purchase is subject to scrutiny
and they will no longer tolerate an open purchase because of
a "perceived" emergency. Ships are realizing that only
bonafide emergency requirements should be purchased and
flagrant abuses of purchasing and TYCOM regulations will be
dealt with accordingly. In some cases this has meant the
ship has lost all purchasing authority.
C. CUSTOMER VIEWS
1. Supply Perspective
Statistical data are useful, but the best way to
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directly affected. This researcher interviewed personnel
from over 40 ships by telephone or personal interview. The
personal interviews took place in Pierside Procurement
offices or onboard ships and included Supply Officers,
Assistant Supply Officers, Storekeeper Chiefs, and Supply
Petty Officers. Additionally, views were solicited from
five Supply Officers who recently detached from ships.
The consensus was that Pierside Procurement was long
overdue as an initiative. The Supply Officers were pleased
to be able to rid themselves of the purchasing function.
Said one Supply Officer,
Pierside Procurement puts the buying function in the hands
of experienced buyers, where it belongs. I didn't have
the time or the resources to make an intelligent buy that
would conform to all purchasing regulations.
As with all initiatives, "growing pains" are a part
of the process. The Pierside Procurement offices were
required to begin operations in a relatively short time-
frame. Numerous problems were encountered and initial
resistance to change was evident. The following is an
excerpt from an Atlantic Fleet customer message:
. . . there are ways to prevent unauthorized purchases
without throwing the baby out with the bath water. It is
recommended that the Defense Small Purchase Course be made
a part of the training pipeline for afloat Supply Officers
. . . incorporate this additional training into the
refresher [SORT] course. Then hold the suppo [Supply
Officer] accountable for the proper and legal procurement
of material. . . . Put some teeth into enforcing . . .
effective correct procurement . . . and this will enable
the CO. to have the procurement authority he needs to
meet his commitments. The bottom line is that this policy
is not helping the ships and is a considerable obstacle to
mission readiness. [Ref. 40]
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This researcher found the majority of Supply
Officers interviewed for this study to be pleased with the
system. The five recently detached afloat Supply Officers
were present during the infancy of Pierside Procurement and
experienced the "growing pains." As a group they felt
Pierside Procurement has shown marked improvement. Said
one:
Initially, Pierside Procurement was so slow that we [ship]
procured the majority of open purchases and documented why
we did it. However, before I left the ship, pierside
improved markedly and we sent 99% of our requisitions to
pierside.
Current problems vary in degree depending on the site
utilized, the TYCOM involved, and the customer interviewed.
Responses, such as the following, were typical of those
encountered by this researcher:
The response is good and it is getting better. Over the
past year, there has been a dramatic improvement in turn-
around time. It is a Supply Officer's dream because it
takes the burden off of me. The engineer hates it because
he can't buy all the handy-dandy tools he used to.
Overall I'm pleased with it.
The whole system makes more sense than getting "bounced
around" NSC. I deal with one person and I'm satisfied 95%
of the time. The central location is closer and more
convenient than NSC. Pierside is very responsive and will
not cancel a requisition unless there is a dialogue
[between NSC and the ship]. Occasionally, we don't get a
hard-copy of the contract until after the material arrives
onboard, but the system is working as far as I'm
concerned.
The negative comments on the other hand, were
primarily from large ships with Commanders as Supply
Officers. This is not surprising, since they are more
experienced and feel they should be given more latitude in
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making purchasing decisions. However, it was noted that
none of those interviewed wanted the purchasing function
returned to their responsibility. Whereas the Supply
Officers of smaller ships were generally relieved about the
transfer of the purchasing function and heartily endorsed
Pierside Procurement, Commanders were, for the most part,
moderately enthusiastic. Said one Supply Officer of a large
afloat unit:
NSC is competing to complete. Many buyers are too
apprehensive to say if a buy less than $1,000 is "fair and
reasonable." They'll come back to me and ask me to
certify price reasonableness even for $5.00. If it is a
judgment call, they always side on the side of caution.
It seems as if we're spending $40.00 or $50.00 to save
$5.00.
Another Supply Officer of a large afloat unit commented:
Overall Pierside Procurement is good, however, we have
encountered a few glitches. Too many requisitions are
being returned because we failed to cross a "T" or dot an
"I." Additionally, we are not always notified when a
requisition is cancelled.
Finally, to complete the spectrum, a Supply Officer of a
large afloat unit supported Pierside Procurement with the
statement:
Pierside Procurement did an excellent job in getting us
ready for deployment. . . . People must realize it is
just going to take longer [to receive material]. ... We
[ships] lost the purchasing function because we didn't do
it right. If there are any problems now they are usually
self-imposed. For example, we have turned in requisitions
with no part number and only one-third of the blanks
filled out.
From these comments one can see that Pierside
Procurement has enjoyed varying degrees of customer
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satisfaction. It appears, however, that most customers want
it to succeed and are working toward that end.
2 . Commanding Officer Views
Though no Commanding Officer (CO.) views were
solicited, Supply Officers were asked how the CO. viewed
Pierside Procurement. In the cases where the C.O.'s views
were known, they were generally negative or neutral.
However, one Supply Officer, whose CO. particularly
disdained Pierside Procurement, said:
The CO. hates it because he wants things yesterday. He
sees a slanted view. He only hears about the 1% of the
time that Pierside Procurement fails to respond to the
ship's requirements and not about the 99% of the time when
Pierside Procurement responds quickly to our needs. I'm
pleased with pierside but the Captain never will be.
Another Supply Officer commented:
The CO. thinks it is a good idea, but he fears the system
will become inflexible and part of a big bureaucracy.
Several other comments from Supply Officers
indicated their C.O.'s were disenchanted, but were not
about to try to understand the system. Other comments
indicated that the CO. did not know or care what Pierside
Procurement was as long as the ship had the necessary
material onboard to get underway.
Though CO.s are not universally sold on the
process, the walls of Pierside Procurement offices are
covered with plaques and ship's pictures conveying thanks to
the personnel who man these offices. One such picture from
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the USS Milwaukee to the personnel at the main Pierside
Procurement site in Norfolk said:
Thanks for your super support! We on the Milwaukee
appreciate everything you have done to help us prepare to




A message from the USS John F. Kennedy to NSC Norfolk
stated:
After . . . experience with the NSC Norfolk pierside
purchasing facility JFK is pleased. The professionalism
and dedication exhibited by assigned personnel . . . has
been impressive. As a result of their responsiveness and
efforts to keep things simple rather than complex, JFK has
received all urgent requirements . . . within required
timeframes. . . . They are aggressively attacking fleet
purchase requirements and are to be commended on their
superb efforts. JFK is committed to the pierside
purchasing concept and looks forward to even greater
success. . . . Captain McGowen sends. [Ref. 41]
D. INSPECTION TEAMS
The Readiness Support Groups at Norfolk and Charleston,
and the SMI Team in San Diego, have favorably viewed the
Pierside Procurement initiative. When queried, the
inspectors could recall only a very few negative comments.
They found that the "growing pains" had subsided and most
customers were pleased with the initiative.
RSG Norfolk's SMIs include Pierside Procurement as a
TYCOM "special interest" item. Thus, each inspection
contains a comment on a ship's "experience" with pierside.
Most comments have been favorable with few derogatory
comments.
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SURFPAC conducts a thorough inspection into shipboard
procurements during an SMI. Improvements in the quality and
quantity (lack thereof) of open purchases have been noted by
inspectors. Though not as enamored with Pierside
Procurement as their east coast counterparts, they see it as
a viable solution to the shipboard procurement problems of
the past.
SUBLANT inspectors also see it in a favorable vein. One
inspector commented:
It gets the job [purchasing] off the ship. Now ships
don't have to call vendors, there is no typing of
contracts and little file maintenance. Yet, the ships
retain purchasing authority if they need it.
Additionally, the ships are relieved of the auditing
function. It takes the workload and the pressure off the
ships.
SUBLANT inspectors have received few complaints regarding
Pierside Procurement and have had a "good experience with
it." In particular, they feel as they have saved
substantial shipboard manhours by the ship not having to
solicit competition or maintain as many files.
E. CONTRACTORS' ASSESSMENT
This researcher held telephone interviews with thirty
contractors in the geographic areas of Norfolk, Charleston,
and San Diego. The results varied greatly depending on the
area surveyed. Contractors were asked what they thought of
Pierside Procurement and how it affected their business.
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Norfolk contractors, for the most part, were adamantly
against Pierside Procurement. Their comments were interest-
ing and a cross-section are listed below:
Do away with it. We have lost communications between the
buyer and the ship. The engineer used to buy from us and
he knew what he wanted—buyers at pierside don't. The
buyers are incompetent. . . . Companies are going under.
The larger companies are surviving and smaller companies
closing down. The industrial base is shrinking. ... We
go aboard ship, do the legwork, tell the ship what it
needs and then pierside gives the contract to someone
else. We are learning to say "No."
Another contractor commented:
There is an air of fear at NSC. . . . The Navy is trying
to spread around business and in doing so they cut their
own throat. They waste more money because of "junk" they
are receiving. . . . Before pierside my profit was 25%-
30% and now it is 17%-18%. ... In theory it [Pierside
Procurement] is working, but it is causing much
discontent.
A third contractor said:
It stinks. It hurts the ship more than anything else
because it holds up the procurement. . . . The personnel
at pierside are good and polite but they could improve by
becoming educated on what they are buying. ... My
business has increased slightly since pierside.
Finally, a fourth disgruntled contractor commented:
The biggest problem with Pierside Procurement is that the
buyers are not evaluated on whether the ship meets its
commitments. We're well aware of delivery but buyers are
only looking at low price. We help ships determine what
they want and then Pierside Procurement shops up and down
the east coast. . . . Pierside Procurement should have
some allegiance to the local economy.
Charleston area contractors were generally less
"concerned" than Norfolk contractors. Comments such as "I
have no feelings one way or the other" were prevalent.
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However, a few contractors were ruffled as evidenced by the
following:
Yes, it has affected business. Now, the buyer doesn't
know what the Navy wants. Often they ask for the wrong
MILSPEC. . . . There is a lack of understanding and they
don't learn. Often, the ship receives the wrong material
and the ship will then call me for assistance.
San Diego area contractors fall between Norfolk
contractors and Charleston contractors in their comments.
One San Diego contractor stated:
I have lost over half of my business. I have had to cut
my labor force from twenty-two to eight. ... We go
aboard ships and show uniforms that are eye-appealing and
pierside will put out a bid and buy from the cheapest
bidder.
Another disgruntled contractor said:
I do not like it because we put salesmen onboard ships to
find out what they want and then pierside goes and buys it
where they want to.
Conversely, one contractor was pleased with pierside and
commented
:
We have a good rapport with North Island [NAS North Island
pierside site] . We have no difficulties with Pierside
Procurement. . . . Our business has increased slightly.
Pierside Procurement appears to have had a definite
effect on contractors. In many cases, contractors fail to
understand the Navy's procurement system and the requirement
for competition. The contractors that have been hurt the
most are the ones who "worked" the ships. Many Supply
Officers would become "regular" customers and buy
exclusively from one vendor. Competition, spreading around
business, and a fair and reasonable price, were not prime
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considerations before the NAS Miramar and USS Kitty Hawk
cases. Now contractors cannot "work" ships and expect
business because the procurement decision is in the hands of
the Pierside Procurement office.
F. TRAINING
Training affects Pierside Procurement in the area of
document preparation. Primarily, training is required to
ensure the ship receives the proper material. Correct and
complete document preparation can also expedite a purchase,
just as incomplete or incorrect documentation can cause an
unnecessary delay. As previously mentioned, pierside
supervisors cited poor technical descriptions as the "number
one" problem with shipboard requisitions.
The Navy has significantly improved training in the area
of procurement during 1986-1987. A new 2 1/2 day Afloat
Small Purchase Course was completed in January 1986. In
just over one year, 560 fleet personnel have taken the
Afloat Small Purchase Course and 290 fleet personnel have
taken the five day Defense Purchase Course. Additionally,
the SORT Course at NSCS Athens has been expanded to include
a full week of procurement training. The Basic
Qualification Course (BQC) taught to all new Supply Officers
and the SORT Course have both been certified to meet the
NAVSUP P-560 requirement of, "All personnel involved in the
purchasing function (e.g., contracting officers, store-
keepers, buyers, and BPA callers) shall attend a NAVSUP
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authorized Small Purchase Course." [Ref. 20:13.103-1]
Finally, some Pierside Procurement personnel go aboard ships
and train Supply Petty Officers on the proper techniques in
filling out requisitions for submission to pierside. This
has proven to be a highly desirable and inexpensive method
of training.
G. COMPETITION
Generally, competition is solicited for purchases above
$1,000, but a "fair and reasonable" price determination for
purchases less than $1,000 is virtually non-existent. This
researcher examined 250 purchasing actions of less than
$1,000 at various pierside offices. Only four purchases
indicated competition as a method of determining a "fair and
reasonable" price. (This excludes GSA mandatory schedules
and the Imprest Fund.) One particularly astute buyer noted,
"It is with the purchases under $1,000 where the vendors
think they can get it over on us." She was the exception
rather than the rule. It is hard to imagine that only 1.6%
of the time, competition is used to make the "fair and
reasonable" determination.
Another area of concern is competitive solicitation for
purchases over $1,000 when two "no bids" are received. In
each case where a buyer was queried as to whether he/she
would seek additional competition, they said, "No." At one
site, this researcher examined thirty "competitive"
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purchasing actions (no sole source) over $1,000—fifteen had
only one bid, eleven had two bids and four had three bids.
The final area of competition examined was sole-source
buys. Of ninety-four purchase actions over $1,000, thirty-
three were sole-source. Some of the justifications for
sole-source procurement were as follows:
"Compatible with existing components"
"Price decreased from last purchase"
".
. . is the manufacturer of the camera. . . "
The above "justifications" are subject to scrutiny during
Procurement Management Reviews.
H. SUMMARY
This chapter has provided an assessment of the Pierside
Procurement initiative from several different perspectives.
Statistical measurements, customer assessments, Commanding
Officer perspectives (as seen by the Supply Officer)
,
inspection team comments, and contractor viewpoints were
presented and discussed. Customers and inspection teams
were generally pleased with pierside and view the initiative
as a viable solution to the shipboard procurement problem.
Commanding Officers viewed pierside as an impediment to the
procurement process and an initiative which limits a ship's
flexibility. Finally, depending on the area, contractors
had "mixed" feelings regarding pierside. These assessments
represent a small sample of the population and are not all
encompassing.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
As a result of this study, the following conclusions are
presented.
A. CONCLUSIONS
Implementation of the Pierside Procurement initiative
was haphazard .
Pierside Procurement started without facilities,
personnel, or money. Naval Supply Centers and Naval
Regional Contracting Centers were expected to reassign
personnel within their activities; find space, equipment,
and furniture for the pierside office(s); and provide
"responsive contracting support," all within two weeks.
This would have been a difficult task even under the best of
conditions.
Resourcing for Pierside Procurement is "perceived" as a
problem .
Productive Unit Resourcing (PUR) is a new initiative and
Naval Supply Centers and Naval Regional Contracting Centers
have "mixed" reactions as to the adequacy of funding
provided by PUR. Three Supply Centers indicated that the
negotiated rates were totally inadequate for their Pierside
Procurement operations. One Purchase Director related, that
since the determination of his negotiated rate, much of his
business has gone to pierside (where the buys are more
105
expensive) from NSC (lower rate) and thus he is losing
money. This is only one of a few problems found to date and
Pierside Procurement is often the area that gets "short-
changed" under PUR if resources become sparse.
The Automation of Procurement and Accounting Data Entry
System (APADE) has the potential to greatly enhance the
Pierside Procurement buying process .
A recently developed initiative, APADE has all the
earmarks of revolutionizing the buying process. Though
there have been problems with implementation, the potential
for APADE as a management tool and buyer's aid are readily
apparent. As APADE comes "on-line" and personnel learn the
system, productivity should increase while PALT and backlogs
should decrease.
The customer base must be redefined to exclude shore-
based activities .
It is unsatisfactory for pierside sites to make
purchases for shore-based activities. Ships should not have
to "compete" for resources when the intent of Pierside
Procurement was to alleviate shipboard procurement problems.
It appears counterproductive for a pierside site to buy for
shore-based activities and add to an already increasing
shipboard PALT.
Training is improving in the area of small purchasing .
Small purchasing, which constitutes nearly 100% of
Pierside Procurement buys, has several programs/courses
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intended to enhance a buyer's "qualifications." The Defense
Small Purchase Course and the tailored 2 1/2 day Fleet Small
Purchase Course are two such courses. Both courses meet the
NAVSUP requirement to certify all personnel involved in the
purchasing function and graduates of the 2 1/2 day course
are issued NAVSUP certificates. The Navy has also recently
approved a Navy Enlisted Classification (NEC) for purchasing
which should help to alleviate problems, such as technical
description, before they get to pierside offices.
The physical locations of Pierside Procurement sites
must be made more accessible to ships .
At all five of the locations visited, it is possible
that a ship would not be within walking distance of a
pierside office. Though in many cases it would not be cost-
effective for every ship to be near pierside offices, it is
possible that ships will open purchase rather than go to
pierside to procure material, due to the distance involved.
NSC Norfolk and NSC Charleston satisfy the requirement for
offices within walking distance in the majority of cases.
NSC San Diego has the greatest problem with physical
location. Presently, the main pierside site at 32nd Street
is inaccessible to approximately 70% of the ships.
The technical screening function should be located in,
or adjacent to, the actual Pierside Procurement site .
The lack of, or the distant location of, a technical
screening function poses hindrances to the effectiveness of
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the program. If no technical screening exists, it is
conceivable that many items with National Stock Numbers are
being procured on the open market. Additionally, buyers may
be purchasing the wrong material due to poor or inaccurate
technical data. If the technical function is located away
from pierside sites and the technician discovers a problem
with the requisition, the chance for clarification is
virtually non-existent and the requisition could be
rejected, cancelled, or the wrong material procured.
Technical information provided by shipboard personnel on
the requisition is inadequate .
The biggest shipboard problem, according to Pierside
Procurement personnel, is the lack of adequate technical
data on requisitions. As mentioned in Chapter III, this is
a major problem because the ship experiences a delay in
receiving material or it receives the wrong material.
Thirteen Supply Officers interviewed admitted they had
submitted requisitions with inadequate or incomplete
technical data. The COMNAVSURFPAC survey indicated the
majority of the requisitions returned to ships were due to
inadequate or incomplete technical data. This adds to PALT




In its present form, PALT is inefficient as a
measurement of the effectiveness and timeliness of the
Pierside Procurement initiative .
The problem, as noted in Chapter III, is prevalent
throughout Pierside Procurement sites. If PALT was measured
in accordance with NAVSUP guidance, it would be
significantly greater at pierside sites and the five day
goal would be met infrequently, if at all. The measurement
of PALT must be standardized throughout the ten reporting
Naval Supply Centers and Naval Regional Contracting Centers
to have any validity.
PALT has increased during the period 1 October 1986 to
31 March 1987 .
The data presented in Chapter IV portray this trend.
PALT is increasing while the monthly productive rate is also
increasing. This is indicative of an increase in volume
while, at the same time, available manhours are not keeping
up with demand.
Pierside offices are not adequately staffed with
clerical personnel .
Most of the Pierside Procurement offices visited did not
have the capability to type their own DD 1155s. Paperwork
was usually sent back to the NSC to be typed and returned to
the pierside site. This adds to PALT and the likelihood the
requisition could be lost.
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Supervisors are knowledgeable and extremely customer-
oriented .
All supervisors interviewed, with one exception were
extremely knowledgeable and customer-oriented. This
researcher was particularly impressed by the number of
shipboard Supply Officers who knew the supervisors by name.
All supervisors were knowledgeable in the requirements of
the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) , Navy Supply
Acquisition Regulation Supplement (SUPARS) , and local
directives and policies. Though they operate in a high-
pressure environment, they appear to handle the pressure
well. The only problem observed during this study was that
supervisors are so overwhelmed with work that frequently
they did not have time to verify the work of their
subordinates.
Buyers, in many cases, lack the fundamentals and/or the
time to make good, cost-efficient purchases .
Buyers operate in a high pressure, quick-paced
environment that demands quantity and quality. Quality is
emphasized, but many times it is sacrificed in order to meet
increasing volume requirements. During the period 1 October
1986 to 31 March 1987, workload increased by 38%, while
available manhours increased by only 10%.
As outlined in Chapter III, buyers often have problems
in making a simple determination of a "fair and reasonable"
price. They are too quick to accept a ship's recommended
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source for a procurement of less than $1,000 and, in a
majority of the cases, will not question "price
reasonableness." For purchases over $1,000, they often
accept two "no bids," even when they have no idea of "price
reasonableness." Justification for sole source purchases is





Establish a semi-annual conference on Pierside
Procurement at Naval Supply Centers and Naval Regional
Contracting Centers to keep Commanding Officers
apprised of changes, initiatives, and problems .
Many COs only understand that Pierside Procurement
delays receipt of their requisitions and they cannot get
whatever they want at any time. As discussed in Chapter IV,
the CO has a "slanted" view of Pierside Procurement. As a
new generation of post-Kitty Hawk and post-Miramar COs take
over, memories of past procurement debacles are slowly
fading. COs must be made aware of "why" Pierside
Procurement exists and "how" it can help them.
2 Process requisitions only for ships at Pierside
Procurement offices.
Pierside Procurement was established for ships, hence
all resources and enerqies should be channeled toward these




Close Pierside Procurement offices on Saturday .
The volume of business does not appear to justify
opening pierside offices on Saturdays. Additionally,
businesses are generally closed on Saturdays. If pierside
offices are open on Saturdays, they should only be open for
half a day as the businesses they utilize usually close at
1 1200 or 1300.
4 Place buyers onboard tenders .
This has been done successfully in the past. During a
visit to a destroyer tender, the Assistant Supply Officer
related how the flexibility of a buyer onboard greatly
enhanced readiness. Although the buyer's PALT was measured
at 13.1 days, the ship extolled the virtues of having that
buyer onboard. The ship could set the buyer's priorities
thus focusing on their unique requirements. With two west
coast destroyer tenders submitting nearly 15% of the open
purchase requisitions for SURFPAC, this has proven to be a
viable program.
5 Ensure all pierside sites have an adequate number of
clerical personnel physically located in the pierside
office .
Insufficient clerical personnel requires buyers to send
their requisitions to the NSC/NRCC for typing. This not
only increases PALT but also increases the probability the
requisition could be lost. Sufficient clerical personnel
would alleviate the above problems and increase the chances
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of Pierside Procurement attaining the goal of a five day
PALT.
6. Locate the technical screening function at the
Pierside Procurement office .
This would facilitate dialogue between the technician
and the customer. Problems with technical data or
requisitions could be handled immediately and thus preclude




Exclude supervisors from buying responsibilities at
Pierside Procurement sites .
This would free supervisors to audit buyers' work and
ensure buyers are properly trained. This researcher
observed supervisors providing status, soliciting
competition, and making awards. Supervisors should
supervise and provide guidance, support, and training.
8 Type Commanders "police" their ships for inordinate
numbers of bearer walk-thrus .
TYCOMs must ensure ships are not abusing the priority
system by submitting bearer walk-thrus for such items as
detergent, plastic spoons, and wax. An effective Pierside
Procurement organization will not become a reality without
TYCOM participation and vigilance.
9 Standardize and enforce the measurement of PALT
throughout all Pierside Procurement locations .
Without a standardized method for determining PALT, it
cannot be used to compare pierside offices in a meaningful
manner. NAVSUP's guidance is explicit, but is not being
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followed. A PALT measurement using the parameters
promulgated by NAVSUP would provide a meaningful base from
which pierside operations could be evaluated.
10. Establish a means to quantify the benefits that accrue
as a result of crossing requisitions to National Stock
Numbers .
This statistic was initially kept at some pierside sites
and provided valuable information. It serves as a measure
of performance for technicians and for shipboard technical
personnel. Additionally, valuable information could be
compiled on the amount of dollars saved as the result of
crossing requisitions to NSNs.
11. Evaluate the effectiveness of buyer pick-up and
delivery of urgently required, locally purchased, non-
standard repair parts and supplies .
NSC Jacksonville and NSC Charleston have started
innovative programs where they pick-up urgently required
material and deliver it to the ship (the same day in most
cases) . This would save manhours that normally would have
been spent by a sailor awaiting requisition processing and
then picking up the material.
12
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Develop a system to enable Pierside Procurement
offices to adequately track a requisition from receipt
to delivery .
Most Pierside Procurement offices can track a
requisition from its receipt to award; however, after award
they are unable to provide specific status. Pierside
offices can only tell a customer when an award was made, who
it was made to, and an expected delivery date. NSC
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Charleston's "Roadrunner" service is one way to centralize
receiving. It is NSC Charleston's intention to eventually
receipt for all material at a central receiving point and




Disseminate status to ships on a regular basis .
Ships do not have the time or resources to call Pierside
Procurement for status on all requisitions. Additionally,
some Supply Officers are unaware of the availability of
printed status. A weekly "Pierside Procurement Status
Report/Message" should be provided to all customers. If
ships are inport, the report should be made available for
pick-up on a weekly basis. If a ship is underway, message
status should be provided for all requisitions.
14 Provide customer survey sheets at all Pierside
Procurement offices .
Customer surveys provide meaningful insight and feedback
regarding the viability of a program. NSC customer survey
sheets are simple, easy to fill out, and have provided
helpful feedback to pierside offices such as NSC Charleston.
Surveys provide an important interface between the Pierside
Procurement office and the customer to the benefit of both
parties.
15 Conduct Procurement Management Reviews (PMRs) at
Pierside Procurement sites on an eighteen month cycle .
PMRs will surface problems in the Pierside Procurement
area that arise due to a lack of training, rapid turnover,
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and incompetency. PMRs are required to raise the level of
proficiency at pierside sites and to identify current and
potential problems.
C. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Subsidiary Research Question 1. What are the key
aspects of the shipboard procurement problem? Shipboard
Procurement problems revolve around the ship's lack of
experience and training in the area of open purchases.
Shipboard personnel do not possess the knowledge, time, or
resources to make effective purchases within the rules and
guidance established by the regulatory agencies. Specific
problem areas include: failure to rotate business for
purchases under $1,000; failure to compete or justify sole
source procurements; splitting purchase orders to exceed
procurement authority; and procurement with large
businesses.
Subsidiary Research Question 2. What were the principal
problems in implementing Pierside Procurement ? The
principal problems involved in the implementation of
Pierside Procurement are documented in Chapter III.
Initially, lack of resources provided the major hindrance to
the success of the Pierside Procurement initiative.
Resources had to be taken from the Naval Supply Center and
Naval Regional Contracting Center assets. This initial
three-four month period was fraught with inefficiencies at
all pierside sites. Other principal problems included:
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lack of/or no technical screening function at pierside
sites; inadequate technical data provided by shipboard
personnel; inordinate numbers of bearer walk-thrus; lack of
standardization of buying practices among pierside sites;
and problems in the measurement and concept of PALT. The
PALT "issue" is a particularly disturbing one and must be
remedied immediately for Pierside Procurement to be properly
evaluated. Mentioned above are the major problems as
identified by the research; however, numerous other problems
are also addressed.
Subsidiary Research Question 3. What are the principal
benefits of Pierside Procurement ? The principal benefits in
removing the buying function from ships are: an increase in
competition; more cost-effective buys; better attainment of
socio-economic goals; relieving ships of resources required
and pressure involved in buying on the open market; and
keeping horror stories off the front pages of the
newspapers. Most importantly, the purchasing function is
being performed by buyers who are making more cost-effective
purchases within the policy and guidance regulations.
Subsidiary Research Question 4. What are the present
standards for measuring the effectiveness of Pierside
Procurement and are they adequate ? The research indicates
that Pierside Procurement is evaluated on PALT, number of
receipts at Pierside Procurement, number of open purchases
placed by ships, and completions and backlogs. The
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calculation of PALT, as a measurement of effectiveness, is
flawed and presently serves to distort most assessments of
Pierside Procurement. Guidelines imposed by NAVSUP provide
an adequate measure of the program, but they are not being
followed at most pierside sites. The number of requisitions
received at pierside offices and the number of open
purchases placed by ships are easily measured and give a
good indication if pierside procurement is accomplishing its
objective—the transfer of open purchases ashore. Thus far,
it is successful in this area. The number of actions
completed has increased drastically, while backlog
fluctuates but has risen slightly. Actions completed and
backlog are indicative of manhours, quality of personnel and
learning involved. Finally, the lack of any major
procurement horror story concerning shipboard purchasing in
the recent past is an indicator of the success of the
program.
Subsidiary Research Question 5. Will the use of the new
Automation of Procurement and Data Entry System improve the
Pierside effort ? APADE is a new initiative that should
greatly enhance the buying process. Early results are
"mixed," but interviewees agree that APADE should provide
pierside offices with modern, state-of-the-art buyer support
services. A shorter PALT and more efficient purchases will
be the result when APADE is fully implemented at all
pierside sites.
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Principal Research Question. Hov effective is Pierside
Procurement and is it a viable solution to the shipboard
procurement problem? Pierside Procurement has achieved
substantial success relative to its original objectives.
Most open purchases are not made by ships, purchases are
made at pierside sites, horror stories are at a minimum, and
PALT (although calculated incorrectly) is achieved the
majority of the time. The problems lie in the operation of
pierside sites and in the measurement of PALT. Generally,
customers are pleased, but feel the system could be
improved. Better status and improved customer service are
just a few of the ways to improve the operations of Pierside
Procurement. APADE should significantly improve PALT and
the quality of purchases when fully implemented. Pierside
Procurement is a viable solution that needs improvement
—
particularly in its statistical calculation of PALT.
Standardization of PALT is the first step to improving
Pierside Procurement.
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Research conducted for this report has provided the
basis for further study and action in the following areas:
1) Examine the costs and benefits of the Pierside
Procurement initiative.
2) Examine the PUR system one year after implementation
and determine if PUR is providing the resources
required for Pierside Procurement.
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3) Develop a more efficient method of measuring PALT that
can be easily implemented at all Pierside Procurement
sites.
4) Perform a comparative study of productivity
gains/losses of APADE approximately two years from
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SMALL PURCHASE DOCUMENTATION SHEET
1. Purchase/D.O. No. 2. Q Fast Pay a Fleet Fast Pay
FSS Contract No. D Warranty Applies
BPA No. /Call No. O Do Dx Rating
Imprest Fund No. Qty Inc. % Deer %
a Bilateral return copies
3. Foreign Item O No
D Yes, Justification
attached




4. O Award All Or None
(Attach DD Form 1784)
O One Quote which is greater
than S1000 (attach price
reasonableness justification)
O GFP $ Acq Value "
D SB Set aside Dissolved
(Attach Memo)
6. SOURCE:
D Tederal Prison Industries (FPI)
O Blind and Other Severely Handicapped







-Award to Lowest Source
g-Award to other than Lowest
Source (attach Documentation)
8- Mail Invoices to:
Single Award






D -SF 44 10 . Remarks
:
Small Business-Small Purchase Set-aside . The following clause applies to
all purchases not over $10,000 when the purchase is to be made to a small
business. It must be read orally to all contractors solicited by telephone.
FAR 52.219-4 "Notice of Small Business-Small Purchase Set-aside (Apr
1984)". Quotations under this acquisition are solicited from Small Business
concerns only. Any acquisition resulting from this solicitation will be
from a small business concern. Quotations received from concerns that are



























If an emergency requirement exists and the material is
not available through standard stock system channels, CO
approval must be obtained before the Regional Contracting
Department can consider local purchase of the material.
NAVSUP Manual Vol. II para. 22311 defines an emergency
requirement as follows:
An emergency requirement is a requirement for
material needed at once and essential to health,
safety, or accomplishment of assigned mission.
I certify that in accordance with the above definition
an emergency requirement exists. I further certify that,
for items involving health, safety, or combat effectiveness,
quality assurance inspection and testing will be performed
to the maximum extent practicable prior to acceptance.
NSN of unavailable material:
Nomenclature:
Signature of Commanding Officer
or Designee
Typed or Printed Name and Rank
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APPENDIX E
CERTIFICATION—STANDARD STOCK IS NOT SUITABLE
STANDARD STOCK MATERIAL IS NOT SUITABLE
If the procurement of nonstandard material is considered
mandatory, CO approval must be obtained before the Regional
Contracting Department can consider local purchase of
material
.
CERTIFICATION—STANDARD STOCK MATERIAL IS NOT SUITABLE
I certify that the standard stock item associated with
the below listed NSN is not suitable and requested
nonstandard material is considered to be essential. I
further certify that, for items involving health, safety, or
combat effectiveness, quality assurance inspection and
testing will be performed to the maximum extent practicable
prior to acceptance.
COG NSN NOMENCLATURE
Signature of Commanding Officer
or Designee







From; Code .20^7 ^uaSu^ [ao&^-^w^T
Via: Supervisor ^- I\^Aa i<M-c)
Subj: Procure
« i\c ( ^-c) / /
1. As discussed in our telephone conversation of
procurement action on- subject requisition has been suspended for
tne following reason:






Need minimum salient characteristics
Commanding Officer certification fo
NSC item Ujv-J^a--^. OTi
Certification of non-acceptability ofatandard stock
item
Foreign-made justification required
Sole source Justif ication
Other (See attached)
If you have not responded by J fp W / f J u}'
_j ) your
requisition will be returned. I I V.




No response to above reterraXi^
f-i
-"T\ — if]
r additional information. Contiet. _____i_d ^ _________:





• N0-HSC-4100-IA (•'•» t «<)
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rrn.nl I poi'lon In pnx.fl o> WgiMni PI EASE BEPIY AS SOOH A3 POSSIBLE No Inlooti.llon OOnlimW In • cont.oc-
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Connect " Based upon these delmilions the actual delivery to the FOB point ol
Is estimated to be
acceptable? Delivery ARO or ARC means "After Receipt ol Order" or "Afler Receipt ol
,
alter receipt ol your authorization.
May funds in the amount ol S bs obligated?
equal In all materialIs material ollered by the low bidder. . ^ ^
respects to the brand-named material tpecilied In the sohclation? For your Inlormalion a copy ol the soliclallon Is attached showing the
description and salient characteristics. See Sections B and C therein.
You are requested to provide a technical analysis ol Ihe reasonableness ol the prices quoted. Detail the basis on which you reach your
conclusions.
Estimated cost lor proposed procurement Is $ Competition must be obtained In ell procurements
exceeding 51000.00, unless suldcient lads are made available lo demonstrate that a valid reason exists to proclude competition. Forward
complete purchase description or provide justification lor non-competltlva procurement.
Federal or Military Specifications are mandatory with few exceptions. It Is requested thai endosure(s) be reviewed to determine whether a
Federal or Military Specihcation is applicable. II so, furnish ordering data Irom Section 6 ol tht specification.
Your procurement request cites Specification
Furnish ordering data Irom Section 6 ol the cited specification.
Your procurement request calls for technical data which requires that a DO Form 1423 be submitted.
The attached procurement requests are returned cancelled per instructions ol ihe person/code Indicated under Remarks below. Action must




REPLY (Use reversa il necessary)
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (Wnen hiitd in)
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PREPARATION OF PROCUREMENT REQUESTS FOR LOCAL
PURCHASE OF NONSTANDARD ITEMS
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
navai Sur*t» S»st(MS rnvuiNO
'Washington oc ;oj;«
Fromi Commander , Naval Supply Systems Command
COM-««CiAt
in "(i» nna »o
4200
0J2J/0168-ABC
20 F£ 8 1906
Subji PREPARATION OF PROCUREMENT REQUESTS FOR LOCAL PURCHASE OF
NONSTANDARD ITEMS
Refi (a) Meeting of NAVSUP/NSC Norfolk/NSC Charleston/NSC
Jacksonville/SPCC at NSC Norfolk 5-8 Nov 85
Encli (1) Minimum Requirements of Preprocurement Processing
(Nonstandard Requisitions)
I. Considerable attention has been given to the problem of
improper preparation of procurement requests for nonstandard
( 1 .e. , 'non-stock numbered (NSN)) items. Often, little
descriptive information is provided which will be helpful to
procurement personnel in determining what the required item is,
where it can be bought, how it is to be used, and how much it
should cost. This decreases the chance that the item can be
identified to a standard stock number and increases the chance
the government will buy the wrong item or pay too much for what
it gets
.
?. The technical personnel at each Naval Supply Systems Command
(UAVSUP) procurement activity act as the screening point for
these requests as they are submitted by the customer. The
technicians review the requests for existence of a stock numbered
item, and for adequacy of submitted data. The technicians should
attempt to obtain the required Information from the customer or
from local research resources, or reject the requisition if the
data c.innot be obtained. In other procurement activities, the
purchasing crganiration must depend on the local activity's
technical organization (such as at a Naval Shipyard) to perform
this f u iic t ion .
J. We recoqnire that the local purchase and technical
nrtani zat ions have been addressing minimum standards for proper
preprocurement processing with varying degrees of success.
These standards are affected considerably by how well local
customer activities do their part in preparation of nonstandard
requisitions, and the degree to which technical groups are
resourced to research and develop data for procurement requests.
As a result, reference (a) was called to develop standard minimum
requirements. Subsequent to reference (a), NAVSUP has reviewed
local Naval Supply Center (NSC) standards and other input.
4. Enclosure (1) is the Standards developed from this Input and
is to be followed by each technical group that performs a
preprocurement processing function. While all the information
cannot be provided by the technical personnel, requirements
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Subj: PREPARATION OF PROCUREMENT REQUESTS FOR LOCAL PURCHASE OF
NONSTANDARD ITEMS
should be established with each customer to ensure the customer
provides this data to the extent possible. While requisition
rejection is not desirable from a customer support standpoint,
especially for remote customers/ rejection may become necessary
if minimum data such as Federal Supply Code for Manufacturers
(TSCM) and part number are not provided. It may behoove
organizations to require clerical personnel to perform rejections
for minimal data such as FSCM/part number, and permit the
technicians to concentrate on the more difficult data, such as a
description .
5. Each addressee should consider enclosure (1) as the minimum^
data to be provided to the procurement
'
function for all non-
standard requirements in order for the purchase request to be
properly developed and processed to completion. Any questions
or comments concerning enclosure (1) should be addressed to
John Gordon (NAVSUP 0323), Autovon 225-6170.
R. H LEE
















MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS OF PPEPROCUPEHENT PROCESSING
(NONSTANDARD REQUISITIONS)
1. Indication that it has been screened against the Defense
Logistics Services Center (DLSC) file or catalog products
.
Include DLSC printout if screening using DLSC remote terminal.
2. End item application identification if it is on integral part
of a next higher order/system/assembly.
3. Federal Supply Code for Manufacturers as obtained from H-4
series Federal Cataloging Handbooks.
4. Manufacturer's or major vendor's part number.
5. Nomenclature ( Common Noun Name)
(Identification taken from technical manual/equipment nameplate/
vendor's catalog or other documentation.)
6. Description (physical characteristics)
Describe item and its intended function.
Vendor's catalog/description required if requirement is of a
S250.0O dollar value. This description should address
dimensions, operating environment, circuit symbol number (if
applicable), right or left hand thread, etc.
Indication of any commercial, federal or military specification -
l f k nown
.
Pictures, drawings - if available - are to be included with
requis i 1 1 on
.
7. Suggested sources - Technical should provide any known
sources, in addition to those shown on the requisition.
8. Estimated price of above $1,000 should have sole source
justification or specifications sufficient for competitive
r eprocurement .
9. Price Estimate - realistic estimate, and the basis from which
the estimate was developed - vendor's catalog (and date of
catalog), previous buy, etc. If the price is from a previous
buy, then indicate, if possible, the quantity of the buy, any
discounts, and other available data concerning the buy.
10. Technical manual - APL, COSAL or other government allowance
or reference manual identification - if known - whatever is
available. This is especially important in the avionics areas.
11. Federal Supply Group (FSG) up to S10K price estimate on
requis it ion
.




Indication of technical review that clearly ldent i f i e s the





Date processed from Technical
13. CUSTOMER
Primary and alternate (if possible) requisition/Technical




CRITERIA FOR BEARER WALK-THRU NONSTANDARD REQUISITIONS
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Subj : CRITERIA FOR BEARER WALK-THRU, NONSTANDARD
REQUISITIONS
1. To process a bearer at either the pier sites or the
NSRPU, the following criteria are required:
— Requisitions must be either IPG I or II (Priorities 1
through 8
)
— Requisitions must be stamped Bearer and signed by the
Supply Officer or Commanding Officer
— Requisitions must contain a statement of justification
explaining the urgency of the requirement. Work
stoppage is not sufficient, but some samples are:
a. Material required to meet scheduled deployment.
b. Material required to prevent/correct critical
discrepancy.
c. Any statement to warrant special handling.
2. Ships indicated on "Hot Ship's List" will be treated as
bearers if the activity desires.
3. To keep the bearer procedure consistent with standard
stock procedures, the following items are not allowed:
a. Clothing.
b. Forms and publications.
c. Common use consumables (hand tools, cleaning
supplies, paints, office supplies).
D.W. BENNETT
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APPENDIX L









































































The following is a list of people who were interviewed
or directly provided information necessary for this
research. Interviews consisted of both telephone and
personal visits. It should be noted that approximately
fifteen people requested not to be named in this thesis and
as such, shall not be listed. Additionally, none of the
thirty-three contractors will be listed by name as most
wished to remain anonymous.
Anastasi, R. CDR, SC, USN, Regional Contracting
Department Director, Naval Supply Center, Puget Sound,
Washington, 23 April 1987.
Anderson, M. , Director Small Purchase Division, Naval
Supply Center, San Diego, Ca. , 3 February 1987.
Bano, E.J., CAPT, SC, USN, Director Regional Contracting
Department, Naval Supply Center, Norfolk, Va. , 26 March
1987.
Bass, T.C., LT, SC, USN, Supply Officer, USS Prebble, 31
March 1987.
Bennett, J. P., LT, SC, USN, Student, Naval Postgraduate
School, Monterey, Ca. , 23 April 1987.
Bergeron, L. , Afloat Branch Manager, Naval Supply
Center, Jacksonville, Fla., various, February-May 1987.
Beugnet, S., Supervisory Pierside Purchasing Agent,
Naval Supply Center, Norfolk, Va., 1 April 1987.
Boggio, J.H. , LCDR, SC, USN, Assistant Supply Officer
USS Acadia, 4 March 1987.
Bosnego, J., Supervisory Pierside Purchasing Agent,
Naval Supply Center, Norfolk, Va., 31 March 1987.
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Brooks, D.M., LT, SC, USN, Supply Officer, USS
Manitowac, 31 March 1987.
Cabarras, D. , Pierside Purchasing Agent, Naval Supply
Center, Norfolk, Va., 31 March 1987.
Canejo, SKCM, Inspector, COMNAVSURFPAC, Supply
Management Inspection Team, San Diego, Ca. , 21 May 1987.
Canfield, T.J., CAPT, SC, USN, Director of Procurement
Management Review Division, Naval Supply Systems
Command, Washington, D.C., 30 March 1987.
Capizzi, D.A. , CDR, SC, USN, Special Assistant to Deputy
Commander for Contracting Management, Naval Supply
Systems Command, Washington, D.C., 31 March 1987.
Cherry, W. , Director Technical Division, Naval Supply
Center, Norfolk, Va., 26 March 1987.
Cohen, J.M. , CDR, SC, USN, Director Resource Management
Division, Naval Supply System Command, various, December
1986-March 1987.
Conley, J., Supervisor Pierside Procurement North
Island, Naval Supply Center San Diego, North Island,
Ca. , 27 April 1987.
Cottongim, D.P., LT, SC, USN, Director of Small
Purchase, Naval Supply Center, Puget Sound, Washington,
23 February 1987.
Cottrell, B. , Lead Pierside Purchasing Agent, Naval
Supply Center, San Diego, Ca., 28 April 1987.
Crandall, S.G., CDR, SC, USN, Supply Plans and Readiness
Officer, COMNAVAIRLANT Staff, Norfolk, Va. , March 1987.
Croll, J.M., CDR, SC, USN, Afloat Systems Officer,
COMNAVAIRPAC Staff, North Island, Ca
.
, 2 March 1987.
Daugherty, M. , Pierside Purchasing Agent, Naval Supply
Center, Long Beach Detachment, Long Beach, Ca., 30 April
1987.
Davis, R.M. , LT, SC, USN, Special Assistant to Director
of Small Purchase, Naval Supply Center, Norfolk, Va.
,
various, January 1987-May 1987.
Dehnz, A.F., LT, SC, USN, Student, Naval Postgraduate
School, Monterey, Ca., 18 February 1987.
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Denigris, CM., LT, SC, USN, Supply Officer, USS
Charleston, 1 April 1987.
Dugas, P.M., LT, SC, USN, Customer Services Officer, USS
Dixon, 3 March 1987.
Easton, F.B., CDR, SC, USN, Supply Officer, USS Dixon, 3
March 1987.
Ellison, J.D., LT, SC, USN, Student, Naval Postgraduate
School, Monterey, Ca., 23 April 1987.
Estridge, S., Pierside Purchasing Agent Supervisor,
Naval Supply Center, Charleston, S.C., 3 April 1987.
Fortin, P. , Pierside Purchasing Agent, Naval Supply
Center, San Diego, North Island, Ca. , 4 March 1987.
Frankwich, J. A., LT, SC, USN, USS John F. Kennedy, 1
April 1987.
Freeburn, G.H., LT, SC, USN, Supply Officer, USS
Hermitage, 31 March 1987.
Garrett, G.W. , CDR, SC, USN, Supply Officer, RSG
Norfolk, Va., 26 March 1987.
Gearey, B.P., LT, SC, USN, Student, Naval Postgraduate
School, Monterey, Ca., 23 March 1987.
Geary, J.J. , LT, SC, USN, Supply Officer, USS Pharris,
31 March 1987.
Gehrlich, J.R., CW02 , USN, Food Service Officer, USS Iwo
Jima, 1 April 1987.
Gibbons, L.B., CDR, SC, USN, Supply Officer, USS John F.
Kennedy, 1 April 1987.
Graf, A.J., CDR, SC, USN, Supply Officer, USS Tarawa, 28
April 1987.
Grove, D.B., LT, SC, USN, Logistics Officer,
COMNAVSURFPAC Staff, Coronado, Ca., various, January-May
1987.
Gustafson, C.W., LCDR, SC, USN, Management Systems
Officer, COMNAVAIRPAC Staff, North Island, Ca. , various,
February-March 1987.
Hagarty, J.M., LCDR, SC, USN, Assistant Supply Officer,
USS Sierra, 3 April 1987.
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Henry, Ann, Pierside Supervisory Purchasing Agent, Naval
Supply Center, Norfolk, Va. , various, January-May 1987.
Heuay, T.A. , LCDR, SC, USN, Retail Supply Operations
Officer, COMSUBLANT Staff, Norfolk, Va. , 9 April 1987.
Hines, J. , Pierside Customer Services Rep, Naval Supply
Center, Charleston, S.C., 2 April 1987.
Holtzmiller, G.
,
Deputy Director Regional Contracting
Department, Naval Supply Center, Norfolk, Va.
, 12 May
1987.
Honeycutt, T.W. , LT, SC, USN, Student, Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, Ca., various, February-
April 1987.
Kolasinski, J.T. , LT, SC, USN, Supply Officer, USS
Sellers, 3 April 1987.
Kufrovich, S., Lead Pierside Purchasing Agent, Naval
Supply Center San Diego, Long Beach Detachment, Long
Beach, Ca., 30 April 1987.
Kimball, D.W. , CDR, SC, USN, Supply Officer, USS
America, 1 April 1987.
Lange, L. , LT, SC, USN, Force Supply Services Officer,
COMSUBLANT Staff, Norfolk, Va., 9 April 1987.
Larmee, D.H. Jr., CDR, SC, USN, Supply Officer, USS
Emory S. Land 1 April 1987.
Main, A.M. Ill, CDR, SC, USN, Readiness Officer,
COMNAVSURFLANT Staff, Norfolk, Va. , various, December
1986-May 1987.
Marshall, SKCS, Leading Storekeeper, USS Claude V.
Ricketts, 1 April 1987.
Martin, J.D., LCDR, SC, USN, Supply Management Division
Head, NSCS, Athens, Ga., 21 May 1987.
Mathews, L. , Pierside Supervisory Purchasing Agent,
Naval Supply Center, Norfolk, Va. , 27 March 1987.
McCloud, J.E., LT, SC, USN, Supply Officer, USS
Portland, 31 March 1987.
McWherter, M.E., CDR, SC, USN, Director of Contracting,
Naval Supply Center, San Diego, Ca., 3 March 1987.
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Meixner, L. , Lead Pierside Purchasing Agent, Naval
Supply Center Oakland, Alameda, Ca., 1 May 1987.
Minter, S., Pierside Purchasing Agent, Naval Supply
Center San Diego, San Diego, Ca., 28 April 1987.
Moore, J.D., LCDR, SC, USN, Director of Small Purchase,
Naval Supply Center San Diego, Long Beach Detachment,
Long Beach, Ca. , 6 May 1987.
Neilsen, T. , Director of Technical Division, Naval
Supply Center San Diego, San Diego, Ca., 3 February
1987.
Nowicki, H.V. Supervisor Fleet Purchase Center, Naval
Supply Center Charleston, Charleston, S.C., 3 April
1987.
Oates, SKC, Leading Storekeeper, USS Peoria, 28 April
1987.
Patterson, C. , Pierside Purchasing Agent, Naval Supply
Center Oakland, Alameda, Ca., 1 May 1987.
Perry, W.K. Jr., CDR, SC, USN, Supply Officer, USS
Holland, 3 April 1987.
Pointer, B.R. , CDR, SC, USN, Director of Contracting,
Naval Supply Center, Charleston, S.C., various,
February-May 1987.
Popp, R.G. , CDR, SC, USN, Assistant Supply Officer, USS
Dixon, 3 March 1987.
Rapaido, E., Supervisory Pierside Purchasing Agent,




Ritter, R.K., CDR, SC, USN, Director of Small Purchase,
Naval Supply Center Norfolk, Va. , 26 March 1987.
Sargent, W.
, LCDR, SC, USN, Supply Officer, USS Iwo
Jima, 2 April 1987.
Skratulia, M.W. , LT, SC, USN, Navy Acquisition
Contracting Officer intern, Naval Supply Center, San
Diego, Ca., various, January-May 1987.
Sloper, M. , Management Analyst, Naval Supply Systems
Command, Washington, D.C., various, February 1987-May
1987.
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Sorenson, C.E., CDR, SC, USN, Supply Officer, USS
Truxton, 28 April 1987.
Stillwell, S., Pierside Purchasing Agent, Naval Supply
Center, San Diego, Ca., 28 April 1987.
Sueur, R. , LCDR, SC, USN, Director of Small Purchase,
Naval Supply Center, Oakland, Ca. , various, February
1987-May 1987.
Vinson, CM., CDR, SC, USN, Supply Plans and Procedures
Officer, COMNAVSURFPAC Staff, Coronado, Ca., various,
January 1987-May 1987.
West, M.A. , LT, SC, USN, Customer Service Officer, Naval
Supply Center, Charleston, S.C., 3 April 1987.
Wheeler, C.S., LT, SC, USN, Director of Small Purchase,
Naval Regional Contracting Center, Philadelphia, Pa., 9
April 1987.
Whitlock, A. , LCDR, SC, USN, SMI Inspector, Readiness
Support Group, Charleston, S.C., 2 April 1987.
Williams, S., Supervisory Purchasing Agent, Naval Supply
Center San Diego, Point Loma, Ca. , 3 March 1987.
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2. U.S. Department of Defense, General Services Agency,
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Acquisition Regulation , Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, May 1986.
3. Conant, Jennet and Miller, Mark, "Scandal on the Supply
Side," Newsweek , p. 19, 5 August 1985.
4. "Grumman Alters Spares Procurement Policy Amid
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Technology , pp. 88-89, 15 July 1985.
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